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ESSAYS
SIAMESE ESSAYS: (I) CTS CORP. v. DYNAMICS
CORP. OF AMERICA AND DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE;
(II) EXTRATERRITORIAL STATE
LEGISLATION
Donald H. Regan*
What follows is two essays, related as Siamese twins. Both essays
developed from a single conception. They are distinct, but they re-
main connected by a shared subtopic. The first essay is about CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America1 as a contribution to dormant
commerce clause doctrine. The second essay is about the constitu-
tional principle that states may not legislate extraterritorially, which I
shall refer to as the "extraterritoriality principle." The shared sub-
topic is the extraterritoriality problem in CTS. (There is an extraterri-
toriality problem in CTS, even though the Court does not discuss it in
those terms.)
I could have separated the essays, but it seemed not worth the
trouble and the duplication of some of the discussion that separation
would have made necessary. Any reader who wishes can read either
essay by itself. But many readers who are interested in one essay will
be interested in both. Because these are merely essays, it will do them
no harm to go through life permanently joined.
I. CTS CORP. v. DYNAMICS CORP. OF AMERICA AND DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
In CTS, the Court upholds an Indiana anti-takeover statute. For
our purposes, we need only a very loose summary of the statute.
Roughly speaking, the statute provides that when an outsider buys a
substantial block of shares in a covered Indiana corporation, the out-
sider does not necessarily succeed to the voting rights normally associ-
* Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan. B.A. 1963,
Harvard University; LL.B. 1966, University of Virginia; M.Phil. (Economics) 1968, Oxford Uni-
versity; Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1980, University of Michigan. - Ed. I would like to thank Alex
Aleinikoff, Don Langevoort, Marty Redish, Mathias Reimann, Fred Schauer, Joel Seligman, and
Peter Westen for helpful comments.
1. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
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ated with those shares. Whether the outsider gets the voting rights is
to be decided by a majority vote of the shareholders of the corpora-
tion. This statute purports to do no more than define voting rights of
shares in Indiana corporations; but its provisions are triggered by a
transfer of shares, and in effect it allows a majority of the shareholders
of a covered corporation to stop minority shareholders from transfer-
ring significant blocks of voting control to outsiders. It is important
that the statute applies only to corporations that are incorporated in
Indiana (and only to some of those). In restricting its application to
resident corporations, the Indiana statute is significantly narrower
than the Illinois anti-takeover statute the Court struck down in Edgar
v. MITE Corp.2 in 1982.
The Indiana statute was challenged by Dynamics Corporation,
which wanted to acquire a substantial block of voting shares in the
Indiana corporation CTS. Dynamics claimed the Indiana statute was
unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause. (Dynamics also
made an argument based on statutory preemption, Which I shall ig-
nore, not because it is obviously mistaken, but because I am interested
only in the constitutional issues.)
The Court rejects the dormant commerce clause challenge by a
vote of six to three. Justice Powell writes the majority opinion, joined
by Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor, and joined in part
by Scalia. Scalia also writes a concurring opinion. White dissents,
joined, with respect to his conclusion and the commerce clause part of
his opinion, by Blackmun and Stevens. 3
A. Anti-Balancing
The first thing I want to point out about CTS is the absence of any
reference to balancing in any of the opinions. According to standard
doctrine, balancing is an essential part of dormant commerce clause
adjudication. The Court announced a balancing test for dormant
commerce clause cases in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.4 in 1970, and the
Court has repeated the Pike test in virtually every dormant commerce
1
2. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). For a fuller description of the Illinois anti-takeover statute struck
down in MITE, see text at notes 105-11 infra.
3. Blackmun and Stevens do not join the part of White's dissent that deals with statutory
preemption. For discussion of the preemption issue, see Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the
Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101
HARV. L. REV. 96, 110-16 (1987). Because I ignore the preemption issue, and also because I
have no definite view on a factual issue concerning the purpose of the Indiana statute, see text at
notes 32-37 infra, I am not arguing for or against the actual result in CTS.
4. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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clause case since. In my view, the standard doctrine is all wrong.5
The Court should not balance, and, despite what it says, it does not
balance in what I call "movement-of-goods" cases. 6 Movement-of-
goods cases constitute the central line of dormant commerce clause
cases, and include both Pike and CTS. If I am right, the Pike test is a
red herring. It was not applied even in Pike itself.7
I take some pleasure in observing that in none of the three opinions
in CTS is there any favorable mention of Pike. Powell mentions Pike
just once, in the course of summarizing the opinion below in the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.8 But Powell displays no sympathy
for the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, which he ends up reversing.
Scalia, in his concurrence, brings up Pike for the sole purpose of stat-
ing that the balancing Pike requires is "ill suited to the judicial func-
tion and should be undertaken rarely if at all." 9 White, in dissent,
makes no mention of Pike at all, even though he would strike the stat-
ute down on other commerce clause grounds. 10
Not only is there no favorable mention of Pike, there is no state-
ment in any of the three opinions of a balancing test of any kind.
None of the opinions (not even White's dissent) endorses balancing in
any way. Powell, writing for the Court, explicitly disclaims any inter-
est in balancing: "We are not inclined 'to second-guess the empirical
judgments of lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation'... ."I'
In a similar vein, Scalia states a proposition that all the opinions tend
to, when he writes "a law can be both economic folly and
constitutional."12
There are sections of Powell's opinion (III.C and III.D)13 in which
Powell does not say explicitly what he is about, and in which it might
seem that he is balancing (even though his disclaimer of balancing,
quoted above, appears in section III.C). Scalia's pointed nonconcur-
5. See Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
6. "Movement-of-goods" cases include all dormant commerce clause cases except those in-
volving taxation, or regulation of the instrumentalities of transportation, or the state as market
participant. I explain why this seemingly ad hoc definition-by-exclusion produces a significant
category, indeed the central category for dormant commerce clause analysis (and why a positive
definition of the category is possible but less immediately useful), in Regan, supra note 5, espe-
cially at 1098-101, 1189-91.
7. For a full discussion of the opinion in Pike, see Regan, supra note 5, at 1209-20.
8. 107 S. Ct. at 1643.
9. 107 S. Ct. at 1652 (Scalia, J., concurring).
10. 107 S. Ct. at 1653 (White, J., dissenting).
11. 107 S. Ct. at 1651 (quoting Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 679
(1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
12. 107 S. Ct. at 1653 (Scalia, J., concurring).
13. 107 S. Ct. at 1649-52.
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rence in these sections of Powell's opinion might even suggest that
Scalia thinks Powell is balancing here, and that he wants no part of
it.t4 In fact, I think these sections of Powell's opinion do not involve
balancing; they are oblique responses to White's arguments that the
Indiana statute has a protectionist purpose and regulates
extraterritorially.15
If Powell does not balance, neither does White. There might seem
to be a suggestion of balancing in White's dissent when he says, "The
majority ignores the practical impact of the Chapter in concluding
that the Chapter does not violate the Commerce Clause."16 But not
every reference to practical impact is an invitation to balance. The
point White is making here is that the statute does not just regulate the
internal structure of corporations. It regulates the transfer of shares.
That point is relevant to White's argument about extraterritoriality,
which does not involve balancing, as we shall see below. 17
In sum, none of the three opinions in CTS endorses the Pike test or
balancing, and none of the Justices appears to be balancing sub
silentio. 18
B. Discrimination
If the Court does not balance, how does it decide the commerce
clause issue?
Powell begins his commerce clause analysis by saying, "The princi-
pal objects of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that
discriminate against interstate commerce."' 9 Scalia joins this part of
14. See 107 S. Ct. at 1652 (Scalia, J., concurring).
15. For White's arguments, see text at notes 32-34 & 45-50 infra.
16. 107 S. Ct. at 1655 (White, J., dissenting).
17. See text around notes 55-56 infra.
18. There is a particular irony in Powell's treatment of Pike in CTS, which I cannot resist
pointing out (motivated, I admit, by an "I told you so" mentality). In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624 (1982), there was one brief section of White's opinion, the section on Pike-based balanc-
ing, that received five votes and thereby became technically the opinion of the Court. It was
Powell who contributed the fifth vote. I have argued, in a previous discussion of MITE, that
Powell really wanted to uphold the Illinois statute, and that he voted as he did with the sole
object of making the official doctrine of MITE as little restrictive of state power as possible. I
argued that in the full circumstances of the case, one should not take MITE as a genuine en-
dorsement of Pike-based balancing. Regan, supra note 5, at 1278-83. The irony I now wish to
mention is that in his opinion in CTS, Powell discusses MITE without ever mentioning the Pike.
based theory which his vote made the nominal theory of the Court in MITE. Indeed, he dis-
cusses MITE as if there were no opinion of the Court at all. He refers to the "plurality" opinion
invalidating the Illinois statute on preemption grounds, and elsewhere to White's "plurality"
opinion on extraterritoriality. 107 S. Ct. at 1645, 1649. Needless to say, I think this technically
inaccurate account of MITE in Powell's CTS opinion is truer to what really went on in MITE
than a technically accurate account would have been.
19. 107 S. Ct. at 1648.
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Powell's opinion, and adds his own statement of the point: "As long
as a State's corporation law governs only its own corporations and
does not discriminate against out-of-state interests, it should survive
this Court's scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, whether it pro-
motes shareholder welfare or industrial stagnation. '20
So far so good. This recognition that discrimination is the central
issue in dormant commerce clause analysis is as much to be applauded
as the rejection of balancing. But there are three respects in which I
wish the Court had either gone further or been clearer.
First, I wish the Court had recognized that discrimination is the
only genuine dormant commerce clause issue in movement-of-goods
cases. 21 Instead, Powell suggests that there is a further issue, namely,
whether the statute "adversely may affect interstate commerce by sub-
jecting activities to inconsistent regulations. ' 22 Now, I think there is a
genuine issue that Powell is pointing to with this language. It is the
issue of extraterritoriality. But it is misleading to suggest, as Powell
does implicitly, that extraterritoriality is a commerce clause issue; and
it could be disastrously misleading to refer to the extraterritoriality
issue with the language of "inconsistent regulations" (though there are
reasons why it is tempting). I shall come back to extraterritoriality
and inconsistent regulations after some further comments on Powell's
treatment of discrimination.
Another respect in which Powell's treatment of discrimination is
disappointing is that he does not explain what he means by "discrimi-
nation." (Nor does Scalia.) We are all familiar by now with the fact
that "discrimination" may refer to explicit use of disfavored classifica-
tions on the face of a statute, or to disparate effect of a statute, or to a
legislative purpose of disadvantaging a particular class. So the ques-
tion arises, which of these meanings is central for dormant commerce
clause analysis?
I have argued elsewhere that what is central for dormant com-
merce clause analysis is discriminatory purpose.23 (Effects and explic-
itness are of course highly relevant evidence on the question of
purpose.) Furthermore, I think Powell's opinion adequately reveals
that his approach to discrimination turns on purpose in the end.
Powell points out that the statute does not discriminate on its face
between in-state and out-of-state tender offerors. 24 This is true, and
20. 107 S. Ct. at 1653 (Scalia, J., concurring).
21. See Regan, supra note 5, especially at 1160-67, 1174-82.
22. 107 S. Ct. at 1649; cf 107 S. Ct. at 1652-53 (Scalia, J., concurring).
23. Regan, supra note 5, especially at 1125-37.
24. 107 S. Ct. at 1648-49.
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relevant, but no one could possibly think that facial neutrality is dis-
positive of the issue of discrimination (nor does Powell suggest such a
thing). The two real candidates for the ultimately determinative con-
sideration are purpose and effect.
As regards the choice between purpose and effect, Powell makes it
clear that discriminatory effect is no more the ultimate issue than ex-
plicitness is. Dynamics Corporation (the offeror) argued that the stat-
ute would have the effect of cutting off more tender offers from out-of-
state entities than from in-state. Powell says this argument "avails
Dynamics little."'25 Citing Exxon Corp. v. Maryland,26 Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,27 and Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mon-
tana,28 Powell concludes that: "Because nothing in the Indiana Act
imposes a greater burden on out-of-state offerors than it does on simi-
larly situated Indiana offerors, we reject the contention that the Act
discriminates against interstate commerce."' 29 So, discriminatory ef-
fect is not the ultimate issue. All that remains is legislative purpose.
Powell's phrase "similarly situated," though it may seem to have
nothing to do with purpose, is actually a further indication of concern
with purpose. "Similarly situated" cannot mean "identical in all re-
spects," nor can it mean merely "similarly treated by the explicit
terms of the statute." It must mean "similar in relevant respects."
(We have all been through this in a hundred contexts.) But what is,
here, the criterion of "relevant" respects? It cannot be "relevance to
an ideal takeover law," since Powell explicitly disclaims any judicial
interest in ideal takeover law, in a passage I have already quoted.30 It
can only be "relevance in the sincere deliberation of constitutionally
motivated Indiana legislators." But that means a statute will count as
discriminating between similarly situated in-state offerors and out-of-
state offerors if and only if it contains terms adopted for the impermis-
sible purpose of disadvantaging out-of-state offerors as such. In short,
purpose is the crux. 31
25. 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
26. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
27. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
28. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
29. 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
30. Text at note 11 supra.
31. It is because I believe purpose is the crux of discrimination under the dormant commerce
clause that I prefer not to follow the Court (or Justice Stevens, writing for the Court) in applying
the word "discriminatory" to unfairly apportioned taxes, Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dept.
of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2820 (1987), or to flat-rate taxes, American Trucking Assns. v.
Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829, 2842 (1987). It is clear enough why one is inclined to call malappor-
tioned or flat-rate taxes discriminatory; but even so, since the unconstitutionality of these taxes
does not depend on the purpose with which they are adopted, I think it is better not to.
1870 [Vol. 85:1865
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Taking it as established that Powell is concerned with legislative
purpose even though he does not say so explicitly, I have one last criti-
cism of his treatment of the discrimination issue: At least on the face
of things, Powell is insufficiently imaginative about what sorts of dis-
criminatory purpose might lie behind the statute.
The only sort of discrimination (that is to say, discriminatory pur-
pose) that Powell discusses is discrimination between in-state and out-
of-state tender offerors. But there are other relevant possibilities, as
White's dissent makes clear. White thinks the statute was motivated
at least in part by a desire to preserve jobs for Indiana workers and
supply contracts for Indiana firms. White sees the statute as a device
for discouraging takeovers that would be followed by removal of cor-
porate operations from Indiana.32 A statute so motivated would
amount to protectionism, attempting to benefit Indiana employees and
suppliers at the expense of out-of-staters who might become employees
and suppliers if the corporate operations were moved. White is right
that state anti-takeover statutes are likely to be motivated in part by
such a purpose, and he is right that such a purpose is constitutionally
objectionable. So, White raises a serious issue that Powell simply does
not address. 33
I do not mean to assert that White is right on the ultimate factual
issue of just what part this protectionist purpose played in the adop-
tion of the statute. The language that White quotes from the State's
brief strongly suggests protectionist purpose,34 and it seems extremely
likely that protectionist purpose played some role in the adoption of
the statute.35 But I have argued elsewhere that the relevant question is
whether the protectionist purpose contributed substantially to the
adoption of the statute.36 That is a harder question.
One reason the question of substantial contribution is difficult is
32. 107 S. Ct. at 1655-56 (White, J., dissenting).
33. Powell's failure to address the issue might conceal a number of different attitudes to-
wards the possible purpose of advantaging local workers and suppliers. Powell may have just
overlooked the possibility of such a purpose; or he may think that such a purpose would not be
constitutionally objectionable (this is one reading of his concurring opinion in Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646-47 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in part)). Alternatively, he may be
giving the state the benefit of the doubt on the question (discussed further on in the text) of
whether Indiana means to be advantaging Indiana workers and suppliers vis-A-vis non-Indiana
workers and suppliers (impermissible) or means instead to be protecting workers and suppliers in
general against economic dislocation, where the scope of Indiana's power to protect just happens
to be limited to Indiana (permissible). (This is also a possible reading of Powell's opinion in
MITE.)
34. 107 S. Ct. at 1655-56 (White, J., dissenting).
35. For a strong argument that the Indiana statute was motivated by protectionist purpose,
see Langevoort, supra note 3, at 106-08.
36. Regan, supra note 5, at 1148-50.
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this: A purpose to protect Indiana workers and suppliers at the ex-
pense of non-Indianans is impermissible, but a statute which was moti-
vated by a general belief that takeovers leading to corporate removals
are unacceptably disruptive of established economic relations, and
which was limited to Indiana corporations simply because those were
the only corporations the Indiana legislature had power to regulate,
would be perfectly permissible so far as the dormant commerce clause
is concerned. Obviously, a subtle decision may be required about just
what the legislature was doing.37
The subtlety of the decisions about legislative purpose that motive
review may require is often mentioned as a reason for rejecting motive
review. For myself, I think that even the subtlest decisions about leg-
islative purpose are more consonant with the judicial role and more
suited to judges' capacities than the decisions required by balancing. I
shall not repeat what I have said elsewhere on this topic (even then
relying mostly on others who had written before me).38
I do have one new observation. If we ask what subject matter
judges as a class are most knowledgeable about (aside from legal doc-
trine), it is surely politics. It is not physics, chemistry, biology, engi-
37. For the small number of readers who may be interested in the details and the develop-
ment of my views on the dormant commerce clause, let me point out that in my prior article I
discussed the sort of problem noted here only in connection with the "no-singling-out" principle,
as opposed to the anti-protectionism principle. Regan, supra note 5, at 1168-69. (For the benefit
of any reader who may not have perfect recall of all my principles, the no-singling-out principle
goes beyond the anti-protectionism principle by forbidding discrimination between locals and
similarly situated foreigners whether or not the locals and foreigners are economic competitors.
Like the anti-protectionism principle, the no-singling-out principle focuses on legislative pur-
pose.) I went so far as to suggest (what I assumed at the time, for no reason except insufficient
thought) that this sort of problem did not arise in connection with the anti-protectionism princi-
ple. We see now that it does. So, one of my stated reasons for preferring the anti-protectionism
principle to the no-singling-out principle, id. at 1173-74, is considerably weakened. I am still
inclined to think this sort of problem is more often troublesome in connection with the no-
singling-out principle than the anti-protectionism principle; but I shall not argue the point, since
I am also now inclined to just go ahead and endorse the no-singling-out principle anyway.
This comment leads to an even more recondite point. The most tortuous part of my earlier
article was the argument that statutes like revenue-tariffs involve protectionist purpose as I de-
fined it. Id. at 1121-23. I have no wish to recant any part of that argument, but I would point
out that shifting from the anti-protectionism principle to the no-singling-out principle makes the
argument otiose. It is clear without argument that revenue-tariffs violate the no-singling-out
principle, by intentionally sparing local producers (whose goods are not levied upon) a burden
imposed on foreign producers (whose goods are levied upon). (The reason there is a further
question about whether the revenue-tariff violates the anti-protectionism principle is that we can
at least imagine that this purpose to treat locals better than similarly situated foreigners who
happen to be their competitors is not accompanied by a specific purpose to secure for the locals a
competitive advantage.)
38. Regan, supra note 5, at 1143-60. The most helpful other writings developing the case for
motive review are Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95, and Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental
Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1041 (1978).
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neering, economics, social psychology, and the countless other
disciplines relevant to balancing in some case or other. No, it is poli-
tics and the behavior of politicians. In other words, motive review, for
all its difficulty, is a form of review for which judges are specially well-
equipped.
C. Extraterritoriality
It may seem to the reader, especially the reader whose primary
interest is in corporations law, that my version of the dormant com-
merce clause simply cannot be the whole story. I have asserted that in
movement-of-goods cases, including CTS, the only issue under the
dormant commerce clause is whether the state statute was adopted
with a discriminatory purpose. 39 In other words, so long as the Indi-
ana legislature does not seek to secure an unfair advantage for Indiana
residents, it can regulate the affairs of even nationally important cor-
porations in any way it pleases without violating the dormant com-
merce clause.4° Can that be right?
I think it is right, but I can sympathize with the feeling that there
must be some other colorable constitutional objection to the Indiana
statute besides the claim of protectionist purpose. (Some other consti-
tutional objection, over and above the claim of statutory preemption.)
There is another colorable constitutional objection, namely, that the
Indiana statute is an attempt to legislate extraterritorially.
In my opinion, extraterritoriality is not a dormant commerce
clause problem. That is why I can concede that there is an extraterri-
toriality issue in CTS and yet claim that the only dormant commerce
clause issue is protectionist purpose. But I shall hold off my reasons
for thinking extraterritoriality is not a dormant commerce clause issue
until the second of these twin essays. 41 The Court has frequently
treated extraterritoriality, when it has arisen in the context of a dor-
mant commerce clause case, as if it were a dormant commerce clause
problem.42 Although I think this is a mistake, I shall pass over the
question of the constitutional grounding of the extraterritoriality prin-
ciple for the present.
I pass over this question in order to focus on two other important
propositions about extraterritoriality, propositions which are in-
39. See text at note 21 supra.
40. This assumes that we are not talking about a case involving transportation or taxation.
That is, we are still talking about a movement-of-goods case.
41. See Part II infra.
42. E.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080
(1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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dependent of my view about the grounding of the extraterritoriality
principle, and which a discussion of the extraterritoriality aspects of
CTS will bring into relief: First, the mere fact that a statute has extra-
territorial effects does not raise an extraterritoriality problem. Second,
the issue of whether a statute is impermissibly extraterritorial is not an
issue that calls for balancing.
I have mentioned previously that none of the opinions in CTS talks
about extraterritoriality explicitly. None of the Justices uses any vari-
ant of the word "extraterritorial." I should therefore like to empha-
size, as indirect support for my claim that the Justices are talking
about extraterritoriality in CTS, something I have just alluded to in a
different connection, namely, that the Court has discussed extraterri-
toriality explicitly in two other recent dormant commerce clause
cases. 43 Most significantly, Justice White discussed extraterritoriality
explicitly in his opinion in CTS's predecessor, Edgar v. MITE Corp.44
In CTS, the extraterritoriality theme is clearest in White's dissent.
White begins his commerce clause discussion by observing, "Appel-
lant CTS's stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange, and peo-
ple from all over the country buy and sell CTS's shares daily."45
White then proceeds to argue that the Indiana law does not merely
regulate "the attributes of shares"4 6 in the corporation, but also regu-
lates the transfer of shares. White does not explain why this distinc-
tion between regulating attributes and regulating transfer is important.
In fact, it would not be important if White were engaged in balancing.
It would not matter to a balancing analysis whether the Indiana stat-
ute were characterized as regulating the attributes of shares or the
transfer of shares, precisely because it is clear that either sort of regu-
lation could have significant out-of-state effects to be balanced.47 The
distinction is important, however, if the issue is extraterritoriality, be-
cause the extraterritoriality principle focuses on the location of the be-
havior the statute governs directly, and not on the location of the
statute's effects. The "attributes of shares" in Indiana corporations
might seem to exist in Indiana; but as White has just pointed out, the
physical events that normally constitute transfer of these shares occur
all over the country, and mostly outside Indiana. So, White's insis-
43. See cases cited in note 42 supra.
44. 457 U.S. 624, 641-43 (1982) (opinion of White, J.).
45. 107 S. Ct. at 1655 (White, J., dissenting).
46. 107 S. Ct. at 1655 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Powell, J., 107 S. Ct. at 1652).
47. For confirmation that the distinction between regulating attributes of shares and regulat-
ing transfer of shares does not matter to a balancer, see Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers:
The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MiCm. L. REV. 1, 93-103 (1986) (Coffee is a balancer, and
rejects what he refers to as the "firm/market" distinction.).
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tence on the attribute/transfer distinction means he is thinking about
extraterritoriality.
Yet another indication that White is thinking about extraterritori-
ality is his claim that the Indiana law "directly" inhibits or regulates
interstate commerce.48 As I have said elsewhere in discussing White's
opinion in Edgar v. MITE Corp. (where references to "directness" and
explicit references to extraterritoriality are intermingled), 49 White can-
not mean to resurrect the old "direct/indirect" test in all its obscure
generality. He must have something more specific in mind, and the
obvious conclusion is that what he has in mind is the prohibition on
extraterritoriality.50
Just as White raises an extraterritoriality objection without using
the word, so does Powell answer him. I suggested earlier in this essay
that Powell's reference to the possibility of "inconsistent regula-
tions"51 was really a reference to the extraterritoriality issue. The con-
nection between inconsistent regulations and extraterritoriality is
simple and direct: if every legally regulable event or state-of-affairs
could be unambiguously assigned to a unique territorial jurisdiction,
then a prohibition on extraterritorial legislation would make inconsis-
tent regulations (passed by different jurisdictions, which is what Pow-
ell is worrying about) impossible. One way to attack inconsistency is
by a prohibition on extraterritoriality, and one reason to prohibit ex-
traterritoriality is to avoid inconsistency.
I do not claim that talk of inconsistent regulations must imply a
concern with extraterritoriality. I claim only that it may, and that in
Powell's opinion it does. (I shall have more to say about the broader
range of concerns which might be suggested by the phrase "inconsis-
tent regulations" in the next section of this essay.)
Immediately after the brief section of his opinion which discusses
inconsistent regulations, Powell launches into a longer section
48. 107 S. Ct. at 1654, 1655 (White, J., dissenting).
49. 457 U.S. at 641-643.
50. See Regan, supra note 5, at 1280-8 1. It is worth noting, as a point of historical interest
and also because it may contribute to White's willingness to speak the language of direct re-
straints, that in addition to its aptness for characterizing extraterritorial regulations of com-
merce, "direct" is also a natural adjective to apply to regulations with protectionist purpose. If
there is a protectionist purpose, then the legislature passing the lav is trying to inhibit some
commerce specifically because of its interstateness. In that sense, the regulation of interstate
commerce is "direct." Thinking about these natural uses of "direct" would allow us to make
more sense of pre-1937 dormant commerce clause jurisprudence than most people would expect
(though not perfect sense, by any means). Cf. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a Re-
striction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31
WAYNE L. REV. 885, 933-40 (1985).
51. 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
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(III.C)52 which does not clearly announce its topic. The burden of this
section is that Indiana corporations are creatures of Indiana law, that
Indiana has a time-hallowed right to regulate the internal affairs of
Indiana corporations, and that where Indiana corporations are con-
cerned, Indiana has an interest in protecting even non-Indiana share-
holders from unfair business dealing. In sum, Indiana corporations,
including their relations with non-Indiana shareholders, are within In-
diana's legislative jurisdiction. Since our core notion of the basis of
jurisdiction is territorial, this is virtually equivalent to claiming that
Indiana corporations and their internal affairs exist in Indiana.5 3
Granting that White and Powell are disagreeing about an extrater-
ritoriality issue, even though they do not say so, who is right about
that issue? White is clearly right when he says the Indiana statute
regulates not just the structure of corporate control but also transfers
of corporate control. He is also right that the physical events that
normally accomplish transfers of control - events in brokers' offices
and on stock exchanges - happen not just in Indiana but all around
the country. However, the actual transfer of control itself - the ex-
tinction of one person's legal rights of control and the emergence of
such legal rights in someone else - is not a physical event. Even
though computer entries representing a sale of stock are made in New
York, we can perfectly well deny that New York is the site of the
nonphysical event which is the actual transfer of control.
Of course, if the actual transfer is a nonphysical event, and if that
is Powell's reason for denying that it occurs in New York, should he
not equally recognize that it does not occur in Indiana? Not necessar-
ily. Powell obviously cannot claim the transfer occurs in Indiana be-
cause of any (immediate) physical connection with Indiana. But he
might say that the transfer is a legal event, and its primary legal con-
nection, which provides its location, is precisely to the state where the
relevant corporation is incorporated. In effect, this is Powell's thor-
oughly traditionalist claim.
(Let me pause to note that if we accept Powell's traditionalist
claim - and I shall suggest presently that I am inclined to accept it, in
a slightly spruced up version - then White's attempted distinction
between the location of transfers of ownership and the location of the
52. 107 S. Ct. at 1649-52.
53. There may be some ineliminable admixture here of an idea of jurisdiction based not on
territory, but on citizenship. (The Indiana corporation is an Indiana "citizen.") I shall have
something to say about jurisdiction based on citizenship in Part II. I could have talked consist-
ently about problems of "legislative jurisdiction" instead of about problems of "extraterritorial-
ity"; but such punctilio might have made it less immediately apparent to many readers what I
was talking about.
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internal affairs of the corporation turns out to be illusory for purposes
of the extraterritoriality analysis of CTS. Powell's point is that the
legal events which are the transfers of ownership should be thought of
as occurring wherever the corporation resides and has its internal af-
fairs. But this does not undercut my earlier claim that White's atten-
tion to the distinction between transfers of ownership and internal
affairs shows he is thinking in extraterritoriality terms. Even if the
distinction does not matter to the correct extraterritoriality analysis of
CTS, it is possible to think it matters. In fact, there are other contexts
where it does make sense to distinguish the location of the transfer
from the place of residence of the corporation for purposes of extrater-
ritoriality analysis.5 4 And even in the context of CTS, it is much more
plausible to think the distinction between transfers of ownership and
internal affairs matters to extraterritoriality analysis than to think it
matters to balancing. So, my earlier claim about White's intention
stands.)
Returning to Powell's traditionalist claim that transfers of owner-
ship take place where the corporation rsides, it must be admitted that
this claim rings a little hollow despite its roots in a still vital tradition
of corporate regulation by states. In the late twentieth century, the
fact of legal incorporation may represent an almost vanishingly atten-
uated practical connection between a corporation and its parent state.
Not just because of their nonphysical nature, but also because of their
nationwide ramification, the "internal affairs" of many corporations
seem to hover above the map of the United States. They seem not
really to belong to any particular spot on that map.
So, extraterritoriality analysis does not seem very satisfactory
when applied to the problem of who gets to regulate transfers of con-
trol of major corporations. Let me emphasize: Even if extraterritorial-
ity analysis seems inept here, that is in no way inconsistent with my
claim that extraterritoriality is what the Justices are worried about,
nor does it suggest that the Justices have mishandled the analysis.
They are attacking a real problem with the best analytical tools at
hand. The tools just happen not to do very well in the precise context.
The reader might wonder whether the Justices could not do better
by the extraterritoriality problem if they approached it a little less for-
malistically. For example, instead of worrying about the location of
the nonphysical event which is the transfer of control, why not think
about the location of the various physical events which will happen in
consequence of transfers of control? That is to say, why not conduct
54. See note 116 infra and accompanying text.
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the extraterritoriality analysis in terms of the statute's extraterritorial
effects?
This will not do. It is clear that the Court cannot flatly prohibit all
state laws that have extraterritorial effects, or even all state laws that
have substantial extraterritorial effects. Such a prohibition would in-
validate much too much legislation. If extraterritorial effects are to
have any constitutional relevance, the most the Court can possibly say
is that extraterritorial effects count against a piece of state legislation.
But then the Court must decide how much these effects count against
the legislation. That way lies balancing. The existence of extraterrito-
rial effects is not an adequate justification for balancing.5 5 What is
more, we have seen that no Justice was interested in balancing in CTS.
So the Justices could not have done what they wanted to do by a less
formalistic approach which looked to extraterritorial effects.
We ought to remember that formalism is not all bad. Some degree
of formalism is of the essence of law. And one of the virtues of the
extraterritoriality principle, stated in terms of what events a state may
regulate, is precisely its formalism. The Court can announce the rule
that states may not regulate events occurring outside their boundaries,
even though such a rule will give rise to some intractable questions
about where certain events occur, questions which perhaps can only be
decided by judicial fiat. The Court cannot announce a rule that refers
to effects, without either prohibiting much more than it ought to or
else committing itself to a balancing inquiry for which it is ill-
equipped. There is much wisdom in Justice Scalia's comment about a
similar problem in a dormant commerce clause case involving the
compensating-tax problem: "I acknowledge that the distinction be-
tween a credit [against a tax] and a straight reduction [of a tax] is a
purely formal one, but it seems to me less absurd than what we will be
driven to if we abandon it.'' 56
If we put aside the possibility of looking at extraterritorial effects,
there is a different argument Powell might have used to make his tra-
ditionalist position on the location of transfers of corporate control
somewhat more persuasive. It runs as follows: There is a collective-
action problem here among the shareholders. In the face of certain
tender offers, it may be rational for individual shareholders to tender,
given their uncertainty about what others will do, even though a ma-
jority of the tendering shareholders, perhaps even all of them, would
prefer that none of them tender. Because this is.a collective-action
55. See Regan, supra note 5, especially at 1160-67, 1174-82.
56. American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829, 2852 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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problem, it cannot be adequately dealt with by different states regulat-
ing the separate transfers between individual shareholders and the of-
feror according to the location of the most salient physical elements of
those transfers. There is no reason of constitutional principle why this
sort of problem should not be dealt with by a state legislature. The
Constitution presumes that legislatures - and not just Congress but
even state legislatures - act sensibly unless they violate specific con-
stitutional prohibitions. So, if we can figure out some way to give one
and only one state the power to attack this collective-action problem
(only one, so that we will not have inconsistent regulations), then we
ought to do so. There is an obvious way to give one and only one state
the power. We can say that all the transfers occur in the state of in-
corporation. Therefore, that is what we will say, for present constitu-
tional purposes.57
This argument has an ineliminable formal content, but it sounds
less formalistic than the ipse dixit that transfers of corporate control
occur in the state of incorporation. (The argument might even seem to
involve a sort of balancing at a high level of generality, regarding not
the specific effects of the Indiana statute, but rather the effects of gen-
erally allowing states-of-incorporation to regulate transfers of control.
I think the appearance of balancing even at this high level is illusory,
but I shall not argue the point.) Something like this is the argument
that I suspect would have led me, if I were'a Justice, to side with
Powell on the extraterritoriality issue.
The problem with this argument, of course, is in the formalistic
claim that legislatures are presumed to act sensibly. Certainly the Con-
stitution embodies some such presumption, but maybe all we can
really say the Constitution presumes about state legislatures is that
they act sensibly when they are regulating intraterritorially. In which
case, we are right back where we started, looking for the meaning of
"intraterritorially." This is the sort of difficulty formalism leads to.
In the end, some hard cases must simply be decided by judicial intu-
itions concerning the spirit of the Constitution.
58
57. Powell does suggest this sort of argument. See 107 S. Ct. at 1646 & n.7, 1651.
58. Given the traditionalist nature of my conclusion about the extraterritoriality problem,
the reader might wonder why I did not simply cite the traditional conflict-of-laws view that a
state has broad authority over the internal affairs of domestic corporations, and have done with
it. (Powell cites the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 304 (1971) for a specific
point along these lines. See 107 S. Ct. at 1649.) The reason, of course, is that the common law of
conflict of laws is not constitutional law. (The full faith and credit clause determines only the
barest outlines of the law of conflicts.) So, even if the argument I make about the constitutional
problem regarding extraterritoriality is one of the arguments that would now be offered in sup-
port of the traditional conflicts view, the argument still needs to be made in the constitutional
context.
Much the same point explains my ignoring throughout these essays the international law of
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(The reader whose main interest is in CTS and who was planning
to ignore the later essay on extraterritoriality might wish to take note
that there is a brief discussion in that essay of the extraterritoriality
aspects of Edgar v. MITE Corp. 59)
D. Inconsistent Regulations
I turn now to the matter of "inconsistent regulations." Both Pow-
ell, in his majority opinion, and Scalia, in his concurrence, say that a
state statute may violate the dormant commerce clause not only by
discriminating against interstate commerce, but also by creating a dan-
ger that interstate commerce will be subjected to inconsistent
regulations.60
Properly understood, this assertion of Powell's and Scalia's is cor-
rect. In fact, there are a number of different "inconsistent regulations"
problems under the dormant commerce clause, as I shall explain in a
moment. But there is also a serious danger that talk of inconsistent
regulations may be misunderstood. It may be taken to indicate that
one particular phenomenon raises a dormant commerce clause prob-
lem when in fact it does not raise such a problem at all.
I want to forestall this potentially very troublesome misunder-
standing, and to that end I propose to discuss what the reference to
inconsistent regulations does not mean before I discuss what it does
mean. This may seem backwards. But it is the importance of seeing
what "inconsistent regulations" does not mean that justifies the exist-
ence of this section of the essay.
Recall Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,6' in which milk dis-
tributors and others challenged a Minnesota statute that forbade the
sale in Minnesota of milk in plastic nonreturnable containers. Now
imagine that the opinions in CTS, with their references to the danger
of inconsistent regulations, had somehow been already in the United
States Reports when Clover Leaf was being litigated. Who can doubt
that the milk distributors would have argued, citing CTS, that the
Minnesota statute impermissibly burdened interstate commerce by
creating a situation in which the distributors were subjected to "incon-
sistent regulations"? The "inconsistency" the distributors would have
pointed to was the difference in milk packaging standards between
extraterritoriality. Once we begin to think seriously about extraterritoriality problems under the
Constitution, we may be able to learn something from international law. But international law is
not American constitutional law.
59. 457 U.S. 624 (1982); see text at notes 105-19 infra.
60. 107 S. Ct. at 1649 (Powell), 1652-53 (Scalia).
61. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
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Minnesota, on the one hand, and states that permitted plastic
nonreturnable containers, on the other.62
Now, it is certainly true that if Minnesota and North Dakota, say,
have different standards for milk packaging, that may complicate the
life of a distributor who wants to market milk in both states. The
distributor could even complain of "inconsistent regulations" on milk
packaging without doing violence to ordinary language. Even so, this
sort of inconsistency in regulation is not generally speaking a constitu-
tional problem at all. The commercial enterprise that chooses to oper-
ate in more than one state must simply be prepared to conform its
various local operations to more than one set of laws. The Constitu-
tion does not give an enterprise any special privileges just because it
happens to operate across state lines.63
To argue that the Minnesota statute in Clover Leaf poses a consti-
tutionally significant risk of inconsistent regulation is to claim, in ef-
fect, that there is a judicially enforceable constitutional interest in
uniformity of commercial regulation. But there is no such interest, in
general. The idea that there is a general interest in uniformity is in-
consistent with our decision to have separate states with separate legis-
lative competences, including separate competences to regulate
commerce.
64
The result of the actual litigation in Clover Leaf reveals that the
Court did not regard mere nonuniformity of commercial regulation as
62. It may occur to the reader that the "inconsistency" could be made even more extreme by
supposing that some other state required the plastic nonreturnable containers that Minnesota
forbade. This would make no difference in the present context. We know the Court upheld the
actual Minnesota law. The argument I shall sketch in the text in support of the Court's holding
would cover the more extreme sort of "inconsistency" as well. Also, if we suppose it would have
mattered to the Court if some other state required the plastic nonreturnable containers, then
should not the parties challenging the Minnesota statute have been able to prevail, even in the
absence of any such statute elsewhere, by pointing out that market forces "required" them to use
the plastic containers for much of their business in states that permitted such containers?
To anticipate the results of some later arguments in the text: Even the most extreme sort of
"inconsistency" does not matter, in a movement-of-goods case, unless the two statutes regulate
the same physical transaction. Cf. text following note 66 infra. But if the two statutes regulate
the same physical transaction, then one of them (normally) is extraterritorial. And if one of them
is extraterritorial, it can be struck down even if there is not the most extreme sort of inconsis-
tency, cf the Arizona/Maine speed limit example in text between notes 141 and 142 infra; in-
deed, it can be struck down even in the absence of demonstrated inconsistency of any kind. Cf
the case of the traveling New Mexican in text between notes 95 and 96 infra. So, the difference
between mild and extreme inconsistency matters much less than we might assume. Only rarely
does it matter at all.
63. The Constitution does protect enterprises against special disadvantage that results just
from being organized across state lines; but mere variation in regulation from state to state does
not constitute such a disadvantage. See Regan, supra note 5, at 1185-89.
64. See Regan, supra note 5, at 1177, 1187. Of course, there may sometimes be a derivative
interest in uniformity, as in the transportation area, but that is not an interest in uniformity
simply as such. See id. at 1177; text at notes 67-70 infra.
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a constitutionally significant problem of "inconsistent regulations."
And to cite CTS in support of the contrary conclusion in cases like
Clover Leaf would be to misread CTS. We shall see in just a moment
that Powell and Scalia are worried about "inconsistent regulations" of
quite another sort. Unfortunately, what I have characterized as a mis-
reading of CTS is just the sort of misreading that lawyers (and judges,
and professors) come up with by paying too much attention to the
words of the Court and too little attention to their sense. My object,
and my probably fond hope, is to preempt that sort of misreading in
this instance.
Very well, supposing I am right about what Powell and Scalia do
not mean by their talk of inconsistent regulations, What do they mean?
If we look at the cases Powell cites in his discussion of inconsistent
regulations, we see that he cites two cases dealing with extraterritorial-
ity 65 and three cases dealing with state regulation of the instrumentali-
ties of interstate transportation. 66 I have already explained how it is
that extraterritoriality is bound up with the issue of inconsistent regu-
lations: one of the reasons we want to prohibit extraterritorial legisla-
tion is to prevent an actor from finding herself subject to inconsistent
regulations governing one and the same transaction. (Notice that a
Minnesota law governing milk sales in Minnesota and a North Dakota
law governing milk sales in North Dakota will never govern the same
transaction, though they may both affect some milk distributor's pack-
aging behavior in Wisconsin.) It is plainly the extraterritoriality prob-
lem in CTS, which we have already discussed, that prompts Powell's
"inconsistent regulations" discussion.
What of the transportation cases that Powell cites? These cases
and others suggest that the Court worries about inconsistent regula-
tions in the transportation context even when the "inconsistent" laws
do not govern the same transaction - that is, even when the laws
stand in the same relation to each other as the Minnesota and North
Dakota laws on milk packaging. The Illinois mudguard law struck
down in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines67 (not cited by Powell, but a
good example for him) applied only to trucks being driven in Illinois.
No bit of driving was governed both by the Illinois mudguard law and
by the "conflicting" Arkansas mudguard law. The Illinois law was
struck down nonetheless.
65. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986);
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
66. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
67. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
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Now, it is not clear that the Court currently engages in the sort of
review of "inconsistent regulations" in the transportation area that
Bibb represents. Bibb is nearly thirty years old, and two of the three
transportation cases Powell cites are older still. The only more recent
transportation case cited by Powell is Kassel v. Consolidated Freight-
ways Corp., 68 in which there were a plethora of theories and no major-
ity opinion. Even so, I am prepared to concede for purposes of
argument that inconsistent regulations review along the lines of Bibb is
alive and well. But if it is alive and well, it is also limited to transpor-
tation cases. The reason is this. Inconsistent regulations review along
the lines of Bibb requires balancing; there is no other way to decide
which of the "inconsistent regulations" to invalidate. Balancing has
no place in movement-of-goods cases, 69 but it may be defensible in
transportation cases. Transportation cases, unlike movement-of-goods
cases, involve a constitutionally significant interest that arguably will
not be adequately protected without judicial balancing. The interest in
question is the national interest in an efficient transportation and com-
munications network. The transportation and communications infra-
structure is important not just to the economy, but also, and more
significantly from a constitutional perspective, to the whole project of
political union.70
For the sake of completeness, I shall go beyond Powell's citations
and mention one more dormant commerce clause problem which
might be discussed in the language of inconsistent regulations. State
taxes on interstate commercial enterprises must meet a standard of fair
apportionment; no state may tax more than its fair share of an enter-
prise's assets or operations. 71 The reason for this requirement is to
avoid cumulative taxation by different states which in the aggregate
subjects the interstate enterprise to heavier taxation than it would bear
if it operated in any single state. The Court has referred to this re-
quirement of fair apportionment by saying each state's tax must be
"internally consistent" - by which the Court means the tax must be
such that if it were applied by every jurisdiction, there would be no
excessive taxation of interstate enterprises.72 This "internal consis-
tency" is really more a matter of generalizability, or hypothetical in-
terstate consistency, than of "internal" consistency. If we start from
the premise, as the Court does, that an enterprise should not be taxed
68. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
69. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
70. See Regan, supra note 5, at 1184.
71. See Regan, supra note 5, at 1185-86, and materials cited therein.
72. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise 'Fax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).
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on more than one-hundred percent of its assets or operations, then the
adoption by any state of an unfairly apportioned tax poses the danger
that the complete set of state taxes to which an interstate enterprise is
subjected will be "inconsistent" in the sense that taxes are levied on
more than one-hundred percent of the appropriate base. In this sense,
the problem of unfairly apportioned taxes can be seen as a problem of
"inconsistent regulations. '73
So, there are at least three genuine constitutional problems which
can reasonably be discussed in terms of avoiding inconsistent regula-
tion by states - two dormant commerce clause problems (in the areas
of taxation and transportation) and one pseudo-dormant commerce
clause problem (extraterritoriality). We can expect that references to
inconsistent regulations will continue to appear in commerce clause
cases.
But it is important to understand that not every situation that
might be characterized in ordinary language as involving inconsistent
regulations gives rise to a commerce clause problem (or to a constitu-
tional problem of any sort). Mere diversity of regulation in a case not
involving extraterritoriality or taxation or transportation - Minnesota
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. 74 is the example I have used, though in-
numerable others would do as well - is not a constitutional problem
at all. Such diversity is precisely what the Constitution contemplates.
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL STATE LEGISLATION
My main thesis in this second essay is that we do not understand
the extraterritoriality principle (the principle that states may not legis-
late extraterritorially) nearly as well as we should. On the one hand,
we have no acceptable account of the constitutional underpinnings of
the principle. In dormant commerce clause cases, courts and com-
mentators write as if the extraterritoriality principle were grounded in
73. By referring to the "internal consistency" language in Container Corp., which is about
apportionment, I do not mean to endorse the broad reading of that language suggested by the
Court's recent opinions in Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810
(1987), and American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829 (1987). The actual results in
Tyler Pipe and Scheiner are probably correct. The former can be explained by the fact that the
tax under review was facially discriminatory, and the latter can be explained by the fact that it
involved flat-rate taxes.
Tyler Pipe demonstrates, incidentally, that even a concept like "facially discriminatory,"
which is designed to establish a bright line, will inevitably have some problematic instances at its
boundary. Cf Regan, supra note 5, at 1229-30 (where I find it necessary to argue that the ordi-
nance under review in Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), should count as
an explicit embargo).
74. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
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the commerce clause.75 In conflicts cases, courts assign the extraterri-
toriality principle to the due process clause or the full faith and credit
clause indifferently, and commentators argue about which is the better
view.76 And so on. (The truth, I shall argue presently, is that the
extraterritoriality principle is not to be located in any particular
clause. It is one of those foundational principles of our federalism
which we infer from the structure of the Constitution as a whole.) On
the other hand, with regard to the content of the extraterritoriality
principle, we hardly know how to begin thinking about what the prin-
ciple entails in any but the easiest cases. (As we shall see, the hard
cases may range from retrospective liquor price affirmation laws to
attempts by states to apply their ordinary criminal laws to the extra-
territorial activity of their own citizens.) Let me emphasize that I
shall not offer a general theory of the extraterritoriality principle. I
shall be pleased if I spur someone else to do that.
There is one area of our jurisprudence in which extraterritoriality
is regularly adverted to, namely conflict of laws. I ought therefore to
explain why I shall virtually ignore the conflicts literature. The main
reason is that the cases I am interested in are quite unlike the standard
fare of conflicts analysis. (CTS and the closely related Edgar v. MITE
Corp. 77 are, of all the cases and hypotheticals I discuss, the ones most
nearly resembling traditional conflicts cases.)
How are my cases different from standard conflicts cases? The
conflicts scholar would say that my cases are special because I am
interested in the extraterritorial application of criminal and regulatory
statutes. Such statutes are excluded from the purview of traditional
conflicts thinking by the doctrine that one sovereign will not enforce
the penal laws of another sovereign 78 and by the assumption that regu-
latory laws are not intended by the enacting legislatures to have extra-
territorial application. 79
I am not fully satisfied by this characterization of what distin-
guishes my inquiry. (I shall offer no characterization of my own, be-
cause I do not think I understand extraterritoriality problems well
75. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct.
2080 (1986), and Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), both discussed in the text below.
76. See Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185
(1976).
77. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
78. See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
79. Cf Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MIcH. L. REV. 392
(1980). (1 cite Brilmayer here as authority for a proposition about traditional conflicts thinking.
I do not mean to suggest that she is a traditionalist herself. See note 80 infra and accompanying
text.)
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enough to say whether the cases I consider constitute a distinct cate-
gory, although I admit they do seem distinctive in some respect.) I
doubt that we can draw as clear a line between penal or regulatory
laws and other laws as the traditional conflicts scholar assumes. And I
want to hold open the possibility that thinking about my problems
might actually improve our thinking about standard conflicts
problems. Insofar as I know anything about conflicts (and I do not
know much), my sympathies are with the revisionist trend toward re-
introducing territoriality as a basic element in conflicts thinking.80
This leads me to suspect that conflicts might benefit from more atten-
tion to the relatively "pure" extraterritoriality problems I discuss.
In any event, even if conflicts scholars are right to ignore the
problems penal and regulatory statutes present, that does not mean
there are no problems. It is true that legislatures do not for the most
part intend their penal or regulatory statutes to have extraterritorial
effect - partly because it is so clear that the baldest forms of extrater-
ritorial legislation are forbidden by our Constitution. But sometimes
states do direct their courts or agencies to apply their own penal or
regulatory laws in ways that hover around the borderline of the prohi-
bition on extraterritoriality. Such cases cannot be dealt with by ap-
pealing to the principle that one sovereign will not enforce the penal
law of another. Nor can they be dealt with by appealing to the as-
sumption that no extraterritoriality is intended. We know what is in-
tended; the question is whether it counts as prohibited extra-
territoriality.
If the conflicts literature is unhelpful, the literature on extraterrito-
rial application of criminal laws is equally unhelpful, for an opposite
reason. The conflicts literature ignores crimes, and the criminal litera-
ture ignores conflicts. The criminal literature rings endless changes on
the theme of a course of criminal conduct that unfolds in a succession
of jurisdictions; but it tends to assume that the defendant's conduct is
reprobated by all jurisdictions concerned, and that the only question is
who gets to prosecute and punish him. On these assumptions, it is
easy to argue in favor of broad extraterritorial jurisdiction - too easy,
for our present purposes. 81
80. E.g., Brilmayer, supra note 79; Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems:
As Between State and Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1315 (1981); Ely, Choice of Law and the
State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981); Martin, supra note
76.
81. See, e.g., Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 30 MICH. L. REV. 238
(1931); Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial
Crimes, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 685; George, Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64
MICH. L. REv. 609 (1966); Rotenberg, Extraterritorial Legislative Jurisdiction and the State
Criminal Law, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 763 (1960).
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With these preliminaries completed, I shall proceed in two stages.
First, I shall explain why the extraterritoriality principle should not be
regarded as grounded in any particular clause of the Constitution, why
it should be regarded as an inference from the structure of our system
as a whole. Then I shall discuss some specific extraterritoriality
problems, actual and hypothetical - not with an eye to presenting a
general theory, but in the hopes of encouraging someone else to try to
develop one.
It was commerce clause cases that brought the extraterritoriality
principle to my attention, so I shall start by showing that extraterrito-
riality is not in essence a commerce clause problem. Consider the case
of Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 82 which contains an unusually forthright
statement of the extraterritoriality principle. Mrs. Patterson, a resi-
dent of Baltimore, owned debt securities issued by various cities and
states outside Maryland. These securities were exempt from taxation
in the issuing states. Mrs. Patterson claimed that by virtue of the full
faith and credit clause the securities were also exempt from taxation
by Maryland.
A unanimous Supreme Court rejected Mrs. Patterson's claim in an
opinion that took just over a page. The reasoning is summed up in a
single sentence: "No State can legislate except with reference to its
own jurisdiction." 83 Specifically, New York and Pennsylvania and
Ohio cannot exempt things from taxation in Maryland. It was not
clear that New York and Pennsylvania and Ohio had even tried to
exempt their securities from taxation in Maryland (though presumably
they would have wanted to if they thought they could); but the Court
was quite explicit that they could not do So.84 The sentence quoted
above does not refer in terms to territory or to extraterritoriality; but
the Court's ensuing discussion is all about the situs of the debts and
their movability. In short, territoriality is presupposed as the relevant
criterion of legislative jurisdiction. The reason New York and the
other states cannot exempt their debts from taxation in Maryland is
that the debts have taken up residence in Maryland with their owner,
Mrs. Patterson.
The Court in Bonaparte cites no constitutional provision in sup-
port of its claim that states cannot legislate extraterritorially. And
quite properly not, since the extraterritoriality principle is not to be
localized in any single clause. In particular, it is clear that the extra-
82. 104 U.S. 592 (1881).
83. 104 U.S. at 594.
84. 104 U.S. at 595.
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territoriality principle as it appears in Bonaparte is not based on the
commerce clause. It is not thinking about commerce that makes it
seem obvious to the Court (and to the Court's audience) that New
York cannot exempt its securities, in the possession of a Maryland
resident, from taxation by Maryland.
Reflection on Bonaparte ought to be enough (if pure reflection is
not) to establish that the extraterritoriality principle does not flow
from the dormant commerce clause. But Bonaparte, with its direct
clash of great sovereign powers of borrowing and taxing, may seem
too peculiar a case to rely on entirely. So let me discuss a quite differ-
ent example.
In the present state of constitutional doctrine, states are free to
prohibit homosexual sodomy or not, as they see fit.85 Georgia forbids
it;86 Illinois does not. Now, imagine that Georgia adopts a law ex-
pressly forbidding acts of homosexual sodomy committed by any per-
son anywhere in the United States. An Illinois citizen, traveling in
Georgia, is arrested and prosecuted by Georgia authorities for a recent
act of homosexual sodomy that occurred in Illinois. The Illinois trav-
eler objects that Georgia cannot do this. And of course, he is right.
The Georgia law is a classic example of extraterritorial legislation, and
it is forbidden by the Constitution. 87
The unconstitutionality of the Georgia law has nothing to do with
the commerce clause. No commerce is involved. Someone might sug-
gest that the law interferes with a commerce-clause-based right to
travel. But the right to travel, commerce-clause-based or otherwise, is
not the real issue. Georgia has every right to arrest and prosecute even
travelers for crimes within Georgia's legislative competence to pro-
hibit. What is important here is not that the Illinoisan is traveling, but
that the act for which he is prosecuted was committed in Illinois.
(Actually, it may be relevant indirectly that the Illinoisan is a trav-
eler, for the following reason. The opposite of a traveler is a resident,
85. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). 1 wish I could think of another example
besides antisodomy legislation that suited my analytical purposes as well. Although I think Bow-
ers v. Hardwick is at least arguably defensible as a matter of constitutional law, I do not think
antisodomy statutes are even arguably defensible as a matter of legislative policy; and I dislike
even seeming to suggest that they might be.
86. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
87. This example makes it clear, incidentally, that the problem of extraterritoriality is not
simply a problem of states trying to make their laws binding in foreign tribunals. Nobody could
entertain this view about extraterritoriality if she actually thought about it, but there are com-
ments in Supreme Court opinions that might mislead the unwary. See, e.g., Alaska Packers Assn.
v. Industrial Accident Commn., 294 U.S. 532, 540 (1935) (suggesting a California law escapes
condemnation as extraterritorial just because California makes no attempt to compel other states
to follow it).
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and a resident of Georgia would be a citizen of Georgia, if we ignore
the complication of resident aliens. It is not so obvious that Georgia
may not regulate the sexual behavior of Georgians in Illinois as it is
that Georgia may not regulate the sexual behavior of Illinoisans in
Illinois. States may have some power to legislate extraterritorially
where the behavior of their own citizens is concerned. 88 But not,
plainly, when they try to legislate for noncitizens.)
The suggestion that Georgia's extraterritorial law interferes with a
commerce-clause-based right to travel is an example of a common er-
ror in constitutional analysis. Just as "nature abhors a vacuum," so
we are taught to abhor constitutional principles without a specific tex-
tual grounding. When such a principle is implicated in some case, we
therefore rush in with misguided suggestions for a textual grounding
inspired by the context of the case at hand. That is why one thinks
here of the right to travel. (The textual grounding of the right to
travel is itself very uncertain; but this is an instance of ungroundedness
we have learned to live with. So, forgetting that the right to travel is
ungrounded, we act as if pointing to the right to travel can provide a
grounding for the extraterritoriality principle.) We can see further
instances of the same specious approach if we consider other sugges-
tions that inevitably spring to mind about how to ground the claim
that Georgia cannot prosecute the Illinois traveler.
One very natural idea is that the article IV privileges and immuni-
ties clause forbids the Georgia prosecution (and, by extension, that
extraterritoriality has something to do with privileges and immuni-
ties). But this is a mistake. The essence of a privileges-and-immuni-
ties violation is discrimination against out-of-staters.8 9 There is no
discrimination here if we assume that Georgia's intention is to prose-
cute Georgians equally with Illinoisans for sodomy committed in Illi-
nois. There is a question, as I have noted, whether Georgia can so
regulate the out-of-state behavior of Georgians. But even if Georgia
can and does regulate the behavior of Georgians in Illinois, it cannot
regulate the behavior of Illinoisans in Illinois. So discrimination is not
the issue.
Another very natural claim is that the Georgia prosecution violates
due process (and, by extension, that the extraterritoriality principle is
grounded in the due process clause). But this is not right either. We
can leave aside as irrelevant to the present discussion substantive due
process arguments about privacy, of the sort rejected in Bowers v.
88. For further discussion, see text at notes 133-50 infra.
89. See, e.g., Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
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Hardwick,90 and also any concerns about Georgia's trial procedures,
which we assume are impeccable. Not so obviously irrelevant is the
question of notice of the existence of the extraterritorial Georgia law.
But we can add to our hypothetical the stipulation that the Georgia
law is widely publicized throughout the country and that it was actu-
ally known to our Illinois traveler, not only when he entered Georgia
but even when he committed his act of sodomy in Illinois. This as-
sumption of constructive and actual notice does not remove the objec-
tion to the Georgia prosecution. It follows that notice is not the
issue.91
Notice aside, it might seem that extraterritorial legislation violates
a due process requirement of "fundamental fairness." This is the best
suggestion yet, but to my mind it is still inadequate. Imagine that in
1800, when some countries permitted the slave trade and some had
forbidden it, one of the abolitionist countries announced that it would
prosecute acts of slave taking or slave trading committed anywhere in
the world, whenever it happened to get its hands on a perpetrator. It
is far from clear that this extraterritorial extension of the country's law
would violate fundamental fairness, or shock the conscience, or
whatever. Of course, our reaction may be influenced by the heinous-
ness of the crime the country is reaching beyond its borders to punish.
But the example shows at least that no notion of fundamental fairness
is a clear and absolute bar to extraterritorial legislation.
There is more to say. Suppose we eventually concluded that extra-
territorial legislation against the slave trade by an abolitionist nation
would be inappropriate despite the laudable goal. Even if we came out
this way, it would be a doubtful case. In contrast, it is clear that Mas-
sachusetts, in 1800, could not have undertaken to punish traveling
Virginians for acts of slave trading committed in Virginia. (And I say
with confidence that the inference would be the same even without
those clauses of the Constitution that disingenuously embody the orig-
inal compromise among the states on the slavery problem.92) But if it
is clear that Massachusetts could not legislate extraterritorially about
slave trading in Virginia, while it is at least doubtful that an indepen-
90. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
91. Similarly, we can remove any concern about a prosecution in Georgia making it difficult
for the Illinois traveler to produce witnesses in his behalf, by stipulating that there are no such
witnesses. Incidentally, the reader who thinks I deal too summarily with considerations of notice
and ability to mount a defense may be somewhat mollified by my remarks in the text around
notes 99-101 infra.
92. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("three fifths of all other Persons"); art. I, § 9, cl. 1 ("Impor-
tation of Such Persons"); art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("Person held to Service or Labour"); art. V (prohibit-
ing amendment before 1808 of art. I, § 9, cl. 1).
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dent nation would be prevented from doing the same by a requirement
of fundamental fairness, we can conclude that Massachusetts is con-
strained by something more than fundamental fairness. Massachu-
setts is constrained by an extraterritoriality principle which is a
principle, not of fundamental fairness, but of our federalism.
In the preceding paragraphs, we have been talking about funda-
mental fairness to individuals. Someone might suggest, instead, that
the extraterritoriality principle is rooted in a due process requirement
of fairness to the interests of other sovereignties. This suggestion also
is misguided. For one thing, the argument we have just considered,
about extraterritorial antislavery legislation, operates quite as strongly
against the claim that the extraterritoriality principle is a matter of
fairness to other sovereignties as it does against the claim that the
principle is a matter of fairness to individuals. We have seen that Mas-
sachusetts is clearly constrained in its relations with Virginia in a way
that England (say) is not clearly constrained in its relations with the
United States. So the extraterritoriality principle as it operates be-
tween states of the United States has some content peculiar to Ameri-
can constitutional law. (When I say "peculiar" to American
constitutional law, I do not mean "unique" to American constitutional
law. Other federal systems no doubt have comparable internal extra-
territoriality principles. This merely confirms that the point is not
fundamental fairness to other sovereignties in general, but rather the
requirements of a very special system of intersovereign relations.)
There is an even more obvious reason for denying that the extrater-
ritoriality principle depends on a due process requirement of fairness
to other sovereignties. Both of our due process clauses are about de-
priving "persons" of "life, liberty or property." It seems clear that
what is contemplated, in both the fifth and fourteenth amendments, is
protection of natural persons (possibly extended to include non-natu-
ral individuals like corporations) and the sort of interests they have, as
opposed to sovereigns and the sort of interests they have. There is
nothing in the language or history of either due process clause that
suggests the slightest relevance to the problem of relations between the
states.93
The only real arguments for locating the extraterritoriality princi-
ple in the due process clause are some ill-considered judicial re-
marks,94 compounded by the accordion-folder quality of the due
process clause as we now view it, and a desire to locate the extraterri-
93. Cf Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evalua-
tion, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1112, 1120 (1981).
94. See cases discussed in Martin, supra note 76.
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toriality principle somewhere in particular. But locating the extraterri-
toriality principle in the due process clause for reasons such as these
merely engenders confusion. Better to admit that the principle has no
particular textual home.
The last candidate I want to consider as a possible textual ground-
ing for the extraterritoriality principle is the full faith and credit
clause. Extraterritoriality is mentioned most frequently in full faith
and credit cases involving choice-of-law problems. In those rare
choice-of-law cases where the Court holds that the courts of the forum
state must apply the law of some other state rather than their own, 95 it
may seem to be the full faith and credit clause that prohibits applica-
tion of the law of the forum to an out-of-state transaction. And there-
fore it may seem that the extraterritoriality principle is grounded in
the full faith and credit clause. But appearances are misleading. It is
true that in this particular sort of case the full faith and credit clause
may duplicate the effect of the extraterritoriality principle. Even so,
we should not conclude that the extraterritoriality principle is just a
matter of full faith and credit.
The structure of the standard private-law conflicts case leads us to
conflate two logically distinct questions: "May the forum state apply
its own law?" and "Must the forum state apply the law of some other
state?" I say these questions are logically distinct, not logically unre-
lated. In any particular case, a positive answer to the second question
obviously entails a negative answer to the first question. If the forum
must apply some foreign law, it may not apply its own law. On the
other hand, a negative answer to the first question does not entail a
positive answer to the second question. It does not follow from the
fact that the forum may not apply its own law that it must apply the
law of some other state. The situation with regard to criminal and
regulatory laws makes this clear. Even if Georgia may not apply its
own criminal laws to behavior of Illinoisans in Illinois, it does not
follow in the least that Georgia must be prepared to apply Illinois
criminal law, prosecuting traveling Illinoisans who come into Geor-
gia's clutches for Illinois behavior that was a crime in Illinois. (Geor-
gia may have an obligation to extradite, if Illinois requests it, but that
is a different matter.)
Our hypothetical about Georgia and the traveling Illinois homo-
sexual might seem to suggest that Georgia has an obligation to "ap-
ply" Illinois criminal law in a different way - not by prosecuting
traveling Illinoisans for crimes against the law of Illinois, but rather by
95. E.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
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refraining from prosecuting traveling Illinoisans for behavior that was
legal in Illinois where it was committed. But this misrepresents the
nature of the constraint on Georgia. Imagine that the traveler Geor-
gia wants to prosecute is a New Mexican, who has committed sodomy
in New Mexico. Now, I do not know whether sodomy is a crime in
New Mexico or not. But even without that knowledge, I say with
perfect confidence that Georgia cannot prosecute the traveling New
Mexican for his New Mexico behavior. If I am right, the reason obvi-
ously cannot be that Georgia is required to apply in any way the law
of New Mexico, which by hypothesis I do not know.
So, there are two distinct questions, whether a state may apply its
own law in a particular case, and whether it must apply some other
state's law. The extraterritoriality principle addresses the first ques-
tion, and the full faith and credit clause the second. It is true that in
any case where the full faith and credit clause requires one state to
apply the law of another state, it also implicitly forbids application of
forum law. So, in some cases, the command of the full faith and credit
clause may duplicate the command of the extraterritoriality principle
(even as it adds something further to that command). But there are
other cases, as we have just seen, where the extraterritoriality principle
operates without any help from the full faith and credit clause. That
suggests to me that even in cases where the full faith and credit clause
is operative and duplicates the operation of the extraterritoriality prin-
ciple, it is probably worth thinking of both principles as present and
effective.
There are further reasons for keeping the extraterritoriality princi-
ple separate in our minds from the full faith and credit clause. For one
thing, the extraterritoriality principle and the full faith and credit
clause (or at least, arguments appealing to the full faith and credit
clause) may come into conflict. Even within the range of traditional
conflicts cases, we should remember that in addition to cases where
the court is constrained to apply foreign law, there are also cases
where it is not so constrained. In such a case, the party who wants the
foreign law applied will argue that application of foreign law is re-
quired by full faith and credit. The party favoring local law may well
respond that to insist on the application of foreign law would give that
foreign law an inappropriate extraterritorial extension. This is just
what happened in Bonaparte v. Tax Court,96 discussed above, where
the forthright assertion of the extraterritoriality principle was pre-
96. 104 U.S. 592 (1881).
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cisely in rebuttal to a full faith and credit claim.97
This suggests a deeper point, about legislative jurisdiction. Full
faith and credit cases talk a good deal about legislative jurisdiction.
But the full faith and credit clause does not set down principles of
legislative jurisdiction. Rather, it presupposes them. As Justice Bran-
deis said: "[Fjull faith and credit is enjoined by the Constitution only
in respect to those public acts which are within the legislative jurisdic-
tion of the enacting State."' 98 In other words, application of the full
faith and credit clause depends on a logically prior understanding of
states' legislative jurisdiction. As it happens, the extraterritoriality
principle is our central principle of state legislative jurisdiction. There-
fore the full faith and credit clause presupposes the extraterritoriality
principle. It cannot be regarded as the basis of the principle.
To summarize, the full faith and credit clause presupposes the ex-
traterritoriality principle, and represents a different sort of constraint
on the states. The extraterritoriality principle forbids a state from act-
ing on its own laws when it should not. (It also forbids a state from
attempting to insist that other states act on its laws, when there is no
proper ground for such insistence.) The full faith and credit clause
imposes a further requirement, that in some cases a state must stand
ready to act on the laws or judgments of another state (assuming the
other state had jurisdiction to enact the laws or enter the judgments),
whether the first state wants to or not.
Let us now look back for a moment. I have argued that the extra-
territoriality principle is not to be located in the commerce clause, or
the privileges and immunities clause, or (more significantly) in the due
process clause or the full faith and credit clause. The argument has
proceeded on the basis of cases and hypotheticals chosen to undermine
each successive suggestion about the grounding of the extraterritorial-
ity principle. It might seem that this "divide and conquer" approach
proves too much. Let us consider a last, conglomerate hypothetical.
Suppose that Georgia wants to prosecute an Indiana traveler for sod-
omy committed in Indiana. Imagine that, as in an earlier hypotheti-
cal, the Indianan had actual notice of the Georgia statute and of its
intended extraterritorial operation. 99 Imagine also that Indiana for-
bids sodomy, and further, that Indiana has, by legislative resolution,
97. Cf. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acci-
dent Commn., 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
98. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 156 (1932). Later cases have seri-
ously undermined the precise holding of Bradford, which upheld the full faith and credit claim,
but nothing in later cases casts doubt on the proposition quoted in the text.
99. Imagine also that there is no unfairness to the traveler in the form of barriers to his
securing witnesses for his defense, or the like. Cf note 91 supra.
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expressed its willingness that an Indianan who has committed sodomy
in Indiana should be prosecuted under an extraterritorial statute by
any other state that acquires custody of the Indianan and that is in-
clined to prosecute. (After all, if the other state is willing to prosecute,
it saves extradition and it saves the time of Indiana courts and prose-
cutors.) To me, it still seems clear that the extraterritoriality principle
forbids the Georgia prosecution. (Indeed, the only way to make it
plausible that Georgia might be able to prosecute is to try to
recharacterize the prosecution as taking place not under extraterrito-
rial Georgia law, but rather under the Indiana law, with the Georgia
courts acting as Indiana courts pro hac vice, by permission of the Indi-
ana legislature.) But the reader might well ask, If Georgia cannot un-
dertake this prosecution, why not? Have we not excluded from the
case by stipulation all the reasons that might underlie the prohibition
on extraterritoriality? I am not certain whether we have or not, but
even assuming we have, that does not mean the extraterritoriality prin-
ciple cannot apply. I have said previously that some degree of formal-
ism is inseparable from law, 1°° and one consequence of formalism is
that a rule may apply to a particular case even when none of the rea-
sons underlying the rule is present in the case.
What all this suggests is that the extraterritoriality principle may
possibly be a sort of formalistic precipitate from a mixture of consider-
ations, many of which are more purely embodied in other specific con-
stitutional prohibitions. But even if this is so, it emphasizes, rather
than derogates from, the operational independence of the extraterrito-
riality principle. And it is perfectly consistent with the claim that we
should justify the extraterritoriality principle, not by pointing to any
specific clause of the Constitution, but by a structural inference from
our system as a whole. Even the grandest structural inference must
depend on ideas that have some concrete manifestation in the constitu-
tional text. o
So much for argument about the independence of the extraterrito-
riality principle. In the remainder of this essay, I shall discuss a few
100. Cf text preceding note 56 supra.
101. Let me just mention two specific provisions of the Constitution which are arguably
relevant to extraterritoriality but which I have not discussed because they are too specialized to
be plausible candidates as grounds for the extraterritoriality principle in general. (1) The sixth
amendment requires that criminal juries be drawn from "the State and district wherein the crime
[was] committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has never held that this re-
quirement is incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. Ironically, if it were incorporated, it
could be pointed to as a specific textual grounding for the extraterritoriality principle in criminal
cases requiring juries, since one state cannot call jurors from another state. (2) The extradition
provision of article IV, § 2, cl. 2, seems to presuppose some sort of territorial limitation when it
refers to "the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
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problematic applications of the principle. I have got this far without
an explicit statement of the extraterritoriality principle. It will seem to
some readers that I must now, finally, offer a statement of the princi-
ple, before I consider the hard cases. I am afraid the reader who wants
a more revealing statement of the principle must be disappointed, at
least within the confines of this essay. Of course I can state the princi-
ple: "For the most part, states may not legislate extraterritorially,
whatever exactly that means." But the statement merely emphasizes
the vagueness of our understanding. The statement begins with "for
the most part" because of the possibility that states may be able to
legislate extraterritorially where their own citizens are concerned.' 02
And the statement concludes with "whatever exactly that means" be-
cause I do not know exactly what it means to say a state may not
legislate extraterritorially. That is the problem I want us to give more
thought to. With that introduction - dispiriting or inspiring, depend-
ing on your temperament - let us move to the applications.
I would begin by discussing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 1 3 if I had not already discussed it in the twin of this essay.10 4
For the benefit of any reader who may have skipped the first essay, let
me summarize the results of the prior discussion. First, both Powell
(writing for the Court) and White (dissenting) recognize and discuss
an extraterritoriality problem in CTS, even though they never use any
variant of the word "extraterritorial" and even though they mistak-
enly (in my view) treat the extraterritoriality principle as an aspect of
the dormant commerce clause. Second, both Powell and White treat
the extraterritoriality principle as a formalistic limitation on state
power, which focuses on the location of the events the state is directly
regulating. They both recognize implicitly that extraterritoriality re-
view is not triggered by the mere fact of extraterritorial effects, and it
does not involve balancing. Finally, the issue Powell and White disa-
gree on is whether transfers of corporate control should be regarded as
taking place in the state of incorporation, or whether they should be
regarded as taking place where the physical events occur that trigger
the transfers (in out-of-state brokers' offices, for example). To the ex-
tent Powell suggests that the Indiana statute regulates only the "attrib-
utes of shares," it might seem he does not get to this problem about
the location of transfers of shares. And White criticizes him on that
ground. But it is possible to read Powell as arguing implicitly that
even transfers of shares should be regarded (in the context of review-
102. See text at notes 133-50 infra.
103. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
104. See Part I supra.
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ing state takeover regulation) as occurring in the state of incorpora-
tion, so that the difference between regulating the attributes of shares
and regulating transfers of shares, on which White insists, is not a
difference that matters. Powell concludes that Indiana may regulate
attempted takeovers of Indiana corporations. I suggested that on this
point I would probably have voted with Powell.
Let us now consider CTS's predecessor, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 10 5
in which Justice White talks about extraterritoriality quite explicitly.
MITE involved the application of an Illinois anti-takeover statute to
an attempted takeover of the Chicago Rivet & Machine Co.
The Illinois statute invalidated in MITE differed from the Indiana
statute upheld in CTS in two salient respects. First, the Illinois statute
was much more explicitly a regulation of takeover bids, that is to say,
a regulation of a mechanism for transferring control of corporations.
There was not even the possibility of arguing that the Illinois statute
regulated only the attributes of shares in corporations. Second, the
Illinois statute was written in such a way that it could apply to target
corporations that were not incorporated in Illinois and that had no
Illinois shareholders. Chicago Rivet was in fact an Illinois corpora-
tion, and twenty-seven percent (27%) of its shareholders lived in Illi-
nois. 10 6 But the statute did not condition its application on those
facts, and it is unclear, as we shall see, whether the Justices took them
into account.
Do these differences between MITE and CTS make any difference
to the proper extraterritoriality analysis of the two cases? I have al-
ready suggested, in discussing CTS, that the first difference (the fact
that the Illinois statute is much more explicitly a regulation of the
takeover process) should not matter. I have suggested that in the pres-
ent context, we should regard transfers of corporate control as taking
place where the corporation has its "internal affairs." So, whatever
state has legislative jurisdiction over the attributes of shares in the cor-
poration ought also to have legislative jurisdiction over the process of
transferring shares and corporate control. 10 7 (Notice that to say the
difference in explicit focus between the Illinois and Indiana statutes
should not matter to the extraterritoriality analysis is not to deny that
this difference might have seemed important to some Justice or other.)
The second difference between the Illinois and Indiana statutes
(that the former but not the latter could apply to a foreign corporation
105. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
106. 457 U.S. at 642 (opinion of White, J.).
107. See text at notes 54-58 supra. And notice the cross-reference there to note 116 infra.
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with no in-state shareholders) is more interesting. It actually raises
two distinct questions. First, is the Illinois statute constitutionally
valid as applied to a non-Illinois target corporation with no Illinois
shareholders? Second, if the statute is invalid as applied to such a cor-
poration, can the statute nonetheless be validly applied in a case where
the target corporation happens to be an Illinois corporation with a
substantial number of Illinois shareholders, even though the statute
does not limit itself to such cases? This second question can be restated
in other terms: When we are engaged in reviewing a statute under the
extraterritoriality principle, what is the significance of overbreadth?
Can Illinois save the application of a statute that is overbroad as writ-
ten by pointing out that the corporation in the case at hand is one it
might have regulated under a more narrowly drawn statute?
Having raised the issue of overbreadth in extraterritoriality review,
I shall make no attempt to settle it. We need a better understanding of
extraterritoriality in general before we can deal adequately with an
issue like this. I will point out that a similar issue arises in connection
with the extraterritoriality aspects of Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
New York State Liquor Authority, 108 which I shall discuss presently.10 9
And it is also worth mentioning that White gives some emphasis in his
MITE opinion to the fact that the Illinois statute "could be applied to
regulate a tender offer which would not affect a single Illinois share-
holder." 110 White's opinion suggests that he might have been review-
ing the Illinois statute as written, ignoring the actual facts about the
place of incorporation and the ownership of Chicago Rivet. To be
sure, White's position in CTS makes it clear in retrospect that it did
not matter to White's vote in MITE whether he reviewed the statute
as written or not. Anyone who thinks the Indiana statute in CTS was
impermissibly extraterritorial would think the same about the Illinois
statute even if he were prepared to take into account the actual facts
about Chicago Rivet's incorporation and ownership. But the question
about overbreadth might still have been relevant to other Justices who
voted with White on extraterritoriality in MITE. Burger (who of
course did not participate in CTS) and, even more, O'Connor (who
participated in CTS and who thought the Indiana statute was not ex-
traterritorial) may have voted against the Illinois statute in MITE at
least in part because they chose to ignore the actual facts about Chi-
cago Rivet, in view of the breadth of the statute as written.
We have one question still undiscussed, of those I have mentioned:
108. 106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986).
109. See in particular text at notes 130-32 infra.
110. 457 U.S. at 642 (opinion of White, J.).
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Can Illinois regulate takeover bids when the target corporation is not
incorporated in Illinois and has no Illinois shareholders? Of course,
Illinois would not claim authority to regulate unless the target corpo-
ration had some substantial connection with Illinois. The actual stat-
ute applied to a target corporation which was not incorporated in
Illinois ind had no Illinois shareholders only if the target corporation
satisfied two other conditions, namely, that it have its principal execu-
tive office in Illinois and that it also have at least ten percent (10%) of
its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented in Illinois. So, is this
enough to allow Illinois to regulate takeover attempts?
The same formalistic approach to extraterritoriality that leads to
upholding the Indiana statute in CTS suggests that the Illinois statute
is invalid in the circumstances we have hypothesized. A corporation
which is not incorporated in Illinois and has no Illinois shareholders
lacks any connection with Illinois so far as its legal identity and owner-
ship are concerned. So Illinois cannot regulate the internal affairs or
ownership of the corporation. In particular, Illinois cannot regulate
takeover bids aimed at changing the ownership. Of course, Illinois
can regulate the corporation's behavior in Illinois. Illinois can apply
its zoning regulations and its safety standards to the buildings in
which the corporate offices are housed. Illinois can apply its workers'
compensation scheme to employees working in the corporate offices.
And so on. But that is because the building and the employees are in
Illinois, whereas we have decided that the internal affairs of the corpo-
ration are not.
Someone might suggest, on behalf of Illinois, that a change of own-
ership of the corporation could have very serious consequences in Illi-
nois. The corporation, after the takeover, might even shut its Illinois
offices entirely. That is true, but we have seen that the extraterritorial-
ity principle is not about the location of the effects of the regulated
behavior. It is about the location of the regulated behavior itself.I1 ' If
it was no objection to the Indiana statute in CTS that it might have
bad effects outside Indiana, it is similarly no defense of the Illinois
statute in MITE that it might have good effects inside Illinois.
Consider a hypothetical. Imagine that Michigan decides to pro-
hibit cigarette smoking completely. It forbids the importation, sale,
possession, or use of cigarettes in Michigan. Now, we know that if
Michigan did this, it would immediately be faced with an enormous
problem of smuggling and bootleg cigarettes. To deal with this prob-
lem, Michigan would have every incentive to prohibit cigarette manu-
111. See text around note 55 supra.
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facture in North Carolina, if it could do so. But it cannot. The fact
that cigarette manufacture in North Carolina has bad effects in Michi-
gan (and it will have bad effects even after Michigan has banned ciga-
rettes, because of the inevitable smuggling) does not give Michigan
even the shadow of a justification for prohibiting cigarette manufac-
ture in North Carolina. Similarly, once we have decided to regard
transactions in ownership of a corporation as taking place in the state
of incorporation, it is of no use to Illinois, trying to regulate a takeover
of a foreign corporation, to point out that a successful takeover will
have bad effects in Illinois.
Lest my position appear too extreme, I should mention that there
are cases upholding the right of a state to punish behavior outside the
state which is intended to cause within the state the sort of conse-
quences that are universally condemned by the criminal law. 112 Cer-
tainly we must recognize some exception to the extraterritoriality
principle for this sort of case. (That is, we must recognize some excep-
tion, in effect. Without making any formal exception, we could solve
the problem by taking a broad view of the extent to which intended
consequences can be regarded as part of the "behavior." We can
either extend the jurisdiction out to the behavior, by recognizing an
exception to the extraterritoriality principle, or we can extend the be-
havior into the jurisdiction, by construing the behavior to include at
least some intended consequences.) But the example of Michigan at-
tempting to prohibit cigarette manufacture in North Carolina shows
that this exception to the extraterritoriality principle must have its
limits also. Illinois' extraterritorial anti-takeover statute does not
come within the exception even if we hypothesize, in a particular case,
that the takeover offeror intends at the time of offering to close the
corporate offices in Illinois. There is not the same intimate connection
between the takeover and the closing of the offices as there is between,
say, shooting across a state line and killing someone in the state. Nor
is the office-closing a consequence the criminal law traditionally con-
demns. (Illinois may, of course, be able to forbid or deter office-clos-
ings directly. But that is another matter.)
Before leaving MITE, let me discuss another aspect of White's
opinion. In the part of his MITE opinion which is nominally not
about extraterritoriality but about balancing under Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 113 White asserts that Illinois "has no legitimate interest
in protecting nonresident shareholders."'1 4 Now, this is plainly a
112. E.g., Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
113. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
114. 457 U.S. at 644.
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claim about territoriality (or, slightly more broadly, a claim about leg-
islative jurisdiction based on a territorial consideration). So, if we take
White's claim at face value, it makes it clear that Pike-based balancing
presupposes an understanding of the problem of extraterritoriality,
just as does the application of the full faith and credit clause. But as it
happens, we cannot take White's claim at face value. What White
says about Illinois' interest vis-A-vis nonresident shareholders cannot
be right, at least not without some qualification.
One possible objection to White's assertion that Illinois has no in-
terest in protecting nonresident shareholders is raised by Powell in his
opinion for the Court in CTS. Powell insists, with considerable justifi-
cation, that in the case of a resident corporation, the state does have an
interest (if it chooses to take an interest) in protecting even nonresi-
dent shareholders from "unfair business dealing" for which the corpo-
rate form might become a "shield." 115
Even if we join White in discounting the significance of corporate
residence, and therefore side with him in this precise disagreement
with Powell, White's bald assertion that the state has no interest in
protecting nonresident shareholders is still too strong. There is no
doubt, for example, that Illinois could enforce its ordinary criminal
law of fraud against persons conducting their fraudulent practices out
of Illinois, even if the victims of the fraud were out-of-staters and the
property they were defrauded of was, instead of cash, their interest in
some foreign corporation. Illinois has a perfectly legitimate interest in
protecting out-of-staters from the consequences of what it regards as
improper behavior in Illinois.116
So, we cannot say unqualifiedly that Illinois has no interest in pro-
tecting foreign shareholders. White's assertion makes sense only on an
implicit assumption that the behavior injuring the foreign shareholders
is not itself in Illinois. And that is what White is assuming, as the
extraterritoriality section of his opinion confirms.
John Coffee has noticed White's assertion that Illinois has no inter-
est in protecting nonresident shareholders, and Coffee has suggested in
response that Illinois may be able to justify its law, or at least raise a
115. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1651-52 (1987).
116. Cf Ely, supra note 80, at 196-99. Notice that this is a case where it makes sense to
distinguish between the location of a transaction which brings about a transfer of ownership in
the corporation and the location of the corporation itself. (Cf text at note 54 supra.) The reason
is that from the point of view of the state regulation in question, namely the ordinary law of
fraud, it is irrelevant that the fraudulently procured property takes the form of shares in a corpo-
ration. It is only when the transfer of shares is being regulated specifically qua transfer of corpo-
rate ownership (as it is by anti-takeover statutes) that we should regard the transfer as taking
place wherever the corporation resides.
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balanceable issue about it, by asserting an interest in protecting local
employees of the corporation and local communities.1 7 But this is the
wrong response. We have just seen that unless White is implicitly as-
suming the behavior which harms foreign shareholders occurs outside
Illinois, the proper response to his claim that Illinois has no interest in
protecting the foreign shareholders is outright denial. And if White is
assuming that the behavior occurs outside Illinois, then, as we have
seen previously, Illinois cannot justify its regulation, or even begin to
justify its regulation, just by pointing out that the regulation serves the
interests of Illinois residents.1 18
All of this is further evidence for my claim that Pike-based balanc-
ing is a mistake." 9 If we assume Pike-based balancing makes sense
and we try to apply it, we cannot resist importing territoriality consid-
erations, as White does. But if we then look closely at the territoriality
considerations, we see that they do not actually operate to qualify or
disqualify interests for balancing. Rather, they operate more directly
to qualify or disqualify certain laws on the basis of the location of the
regulated activity.
Let us now look at another dormant commerce clause case, Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 120 which
involves a quite different extraterritoriality problem. Brown-Forman is
a fascinating case in many respects. The economic implications of the
New York statute and the question whether the statute was motivated
by protectionist purpose are more complex than the Court recognizes.
But I shall restrict my attention to the extraterritoriality problem, and
117. Coffee, supra note 47, at 98-99.
118. See text at notes 111-12 supra. The reader may wonder what I make of White's asser-
tion that "protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective," 457 U.S. at 644,
which occurs just before his assertion that a state has no interest in protecting nonresident share-
holders. White could be taken as saying here that a state may protect local investors even against
the consequences of out-of-state transactions, which is inconsistent with what I have been argu-
ing. But it is far from clear White means to say this. For one thing, White may have stuck in
this claim just for the rhetorical effect of the contrast between protecting residents and protecting
foreigners. Certainly it is not the state's right to protect residents that is important to White in
the present context. So he may just not have thought much about what he was saying. Alterna-
tively, remember that for White the location of a stock transaction for purposes of extraterritori-
ality analysis is not tied to the location of the corporation (not even in the context of anti-
takeover regulation). White's dissent in CTS makes that clear. See text at notes 45-47 supra. So
what White may have in mind is that a state may protect local investors against the ill effects of
local stock transactions. In sum, I see no strong reason to read White's claim about protecting
local investors as saying anything I would disagree with. But if he really does mean that the state
can, in general, protect local investors against the consequences of out-of-state transactions, then
I think he is just mistaken.
119. See generally Regan, supra note 5.
120. 106 S. Ct. 2080 (1986).
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indeed to a simplified version of that.1 21
As part of its regulation of the liquor industry, New York had a
prospectively operating "affirmation law." This law provided that on
the twenty-fifth of each month, any distiller who sold to wholesalers in
New York was required to file a price schedule for its products, which
would be effective for the second succeeding month. In addition, the
distiller was required to affirm that it would not sell liquor at a lower
price to any wholesaler anywhere else in the country during that fu-
ture month. Violations of this affirmation were punishable by revoca-
tion of the distiller's license to sell liquor in New York, and by
forfeiture of a bond posted by the distiller in connection with the
license.
The basic question is, Does this affirmation law run afoul of the
extraterritoriality principle? The Court held that it did. I am inclined
to think the Court was right.
Once a distiller filed a price schedule with the New York Liquor
Authority on May 25, say, for the month of July, it effectively became
the law of New York that the distiller could not sell at a lower price,
in July, to a wholesaler in Texas. Any sale by the distiller at a lower
price in Texas in July would be subject to sanction by the New York
Liquor Authority. The case seems essentially identical with the case
of the Illinois traveler prosecuted under Georgia's extraterritorial sod-
omy statute. 122
There is one difference between Brown-Forman and the Georgia
sodomy case. In Brown-Forman, the distiller has cooperated in the
creation of the New York law that binds him extraterritorially. He
filed the price schedule to which he is held. He might retort that he
was required to file the schedule as a condition of doing business in
New York; but it remains true that he could have prevented the exist-
ence of any New York law relevant to his out-of-state conduct by do-
ing no business in New York, whereas the Illinois traveler had no way
of preventing the existence of the Georgia sodomy statute. (The Illi-
nois traveler might have avoided prosecution by staying out of Geor-
gia, but that is a different matter.)
Does it matter that the distiller cooperated in creating the legisla-
tion complained of? I doubt that it matters, even if we leave com-
pletely to one side his objection that he cooperated under duress.
Suppose that Jones, a resident of Illinois, swears out an affidavit in a fit
121. I shall ignore the problems generated by the interaction of different states' policies con-
cerning promotional discounts.
122. See text at notes 85-87 supra.
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of bravado undertaking to be bound by all laws of Georgia that Geor-
gia wishes to give extraterritorial effect to. If Jones thereafter commits
an act of homosexual sodomy in Illinois, and follows it by traveling to
Georgia, can Georgia prosecute him for what he did in Illinois? I
hardly think so. Nor would it be enough even if the affidavit was
sworn out in Georgia on a previous trip, and if it was in the form of a
promise to obey all the extraterritorial laws of Georgia wherever in the
country Jones found himself.
If a free undertaking to be bound by extraterritorial legislation,
whether by Jones or by a distiller, does not confer extraterritorial ju-
risdiction, then it seems even clearer that the distiller's actual affirma-
tion, which was to some degree compelled by the New York licensing
requirements, should not grant extraterritorial jurisdiction. Of course,
New York might argue that instead of compelling the distiller's coop-
eration by the threat of exclusion from New York, it has rather bought
his cooperation by giving him access to New York. So, New York
would say, New York is not worse off than Georgia for having com-
pelled the foreigner's submission to extraterritorial jurisdiction; rather,
it is better off for having given good consideration for the foreigner's
promise, which ought therefore to be binding.
This raises the question whether New York can count its allowing
the distiller to do business in New York as consideration for his sub-
mission to extraterritorial jurisdiction. Conceivably it can in the very
special circumstances of the liquor business;123 but surely it cannot in
general. At this point the sharp-eyed reader might point out that in
order to understand why New York cannot count allowing the distil-
ler to do business in New York as a boon to the distiller, we must look
to the principles embodied in the privileges and immunities clause, or
the dormant commerce clause. So much I freely admit. But that does
not undermine my previous claim for the independent existence of the
extraterritoriality principle. In arguing that the extraterritoriality
principle was not grounded in privileges and immunities, or in the dor-
mant commerce clause, or elsewhere, I never meant to suggest that all
possible extraterritoriality questions could be resolved without any ref-
erence whatsoever to other constitutional values. That is a test for
independent existence that no constitutional principle could pass.
Assuming the Court was right to invalidate the prospectively oper-
ating affirmation law in Brown-Forman, that raises the question, What
123. How far the twenty-first amendment, sometimes said to give the states plenary power
over the liquor business, should be interpreted to justify otherwise unconstitutional state legisla-
tion is a matter that currently divides the Court. See, e.g., Stevens' dissent in Brown-Forman, 106
S. Ct. at 2090-91.
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about retrospective affirmation laws? What about a law that requires,
along with the filing on May 25 of a price schedule for July, an affir-
mation that no lower price was charged anywhere in the country dur-
ing the month of April? The Court explicitly declined to answer this
question. 124 (It has upheld retrospective affirmation laws in the
past, 25 but it explicitly declined to say whether it would respect that
precedent in the future.)
At the very least, the Court is right to suspect that the difference
between prospective and retrospective affirmation may make a differ-
ence. For myself, I think retrospective affirmation laws do not violate
the extraterritoriality principle. A retrospective affirmation law
adopted in New York conditions what can be done in New York in the
future on what has been done in Texas in the past, but it says nothing
about what can be done in Texas in the future. It simply does not
attempt to govern any future extraterritorial behavior, as the prospec-
tive affirmation law does. (Nor does it attempt to govern past behav-
ior anywhere. It is not retrospective in that sense.)
Someone might argue that even a retrospective affirmation law in
New York can have an effect on future pricing behavior in Texas.
That is absolutely true, but in my opinion it is irrelevant. I have ex-
plained already that the extraterritoriality principle is a formal princi-
ple. It does not look at effects, which would require balancing. 126 The
question is not where the law has effects, but where the behavior is
that the law governs. From that point of view, retrospective affirma-
tion laws are quite different from prospective ones.
Notice that all I have said about retrospective affirmation laws is
that they do not violate the extraterritoriality principle. That is not to
say they are always constitutional. Because of its explicit reference to
economic behavior outside the enacting state, any retrospective affir-
mation law deserves a close look to see whether it is motivated by
protectionist purpose. Remember Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 127 in
which the Court struck down a New York statute forbidding the sale
in New York of milk that had been bought from producers in Ver-
mont at less than New York's minimum-price-to-producers. The stat-
ute in Baldwin did not involve any affirmation, but it was like the
retrospective affirmation law in that it conditioned the legality of cer-
tain current behavior in New York on past pricing behavior elsewhere.
The statute in Baldwin was struck down, not because it operated ex-
124. 106 S. Ct. at 2087 n.6.
125. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
126. See text around note 55 supra.
127. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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traterritorially (although some people have read the case that way),128
but because of the statute's clear purpose to protect in-state milk pro-
ducers, coupled with the impossibility of establishing definitively that
the statute did no more than neutralize the competitive damage done
to in-state producers by the in-state minimum price. 129
In addition to the issues we have already canvassed, Brown-For-
man also presents an issue about whether extraterritoriality review
should focus on the statute as written, or should take into account
facts specific to the case at hand. The issue takes a somewhat different
form in Brown-Forman than it took in Edgar v. MITE Corp. 130 In
MITE, the question was whether to take into account that Chicago
Rivet & Machine Co. was an Illinois corporation with a substantial
number of Illinois shareholders. There was no doubt about this fact;
the only doubt was about whether to consider it. In Brown-Forman, in
contrast, the question is whether to take into account the possibility
that the New York and out-of-state liquor authorities might adminis-
ter their various regulatory schemes in such a way as to prevent the
facially extraterritorial New York law from having any actual influ-
ence on distillers' out-of-state pricing behavior. One could argue that
if the New York law did not actually influence any out-of-state behav-
ior, it should not be thought of as governing extraterritorial behavior
at all. The dissenters were prepared to consider this argument.' 3t The
majority was not. 132
One last case, this time hypothetical. Since I have argued that ex-
traterritoriality is not a commerce clause problem, let me point out a
potentially serious non-commerce clause extraterritoriality problem
that may be in our future. Suppose that Roe v. Wade 33 is overruled.
(I am not predicting that; but there is no shortage of people who think
it a real possibility.) Some states would continue to permit abortion
essentially on demand; some states would enact very restrictive abor-
tion laws. Now, imagine that an extreme anti-abortion state adopts a
128. Justice Roberts, writing for the Court in Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods.,
306 U.S. 346 (1939), appears at one point to say the vice of the statute invalidated in Baldwin was
that it "regulate[d] the price to be paid for milk in a sister state." 306 U.S. at 353. See also Blasi,
Constitutional Limitations on the Power of States to Regulate the Movement of Goods ii Interstate
Commerce, in I COURTS AND FREE MARKETS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPE 174, 188-91 (T. Sandalow & E. Stein eds. 1982) (treating Baldwin as a case about extra-
territoriality, and distinguishing Eisenberg on that ground). For my reading of Eisenberg, see
Regan, supra note 5, at 1257-62.
129. See Regan, supra note 5, at 1245-52.
130. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
131. 106 S. Ct. at 2089-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. 106 S. Ct. at 2086-87.
133. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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law not only forbidding abortion in the state, but also forbidding its
citizens to have abortions out-of-state. (A felt need to protect the fetus
might motivate this unusually direct attempt at extraterritoriality.)
Can the state do this?
In his opinion for the Court in Bigelow v. Virginia, Justice Black-
mun asserts that Virginia cannot prevent Virginia residents from trav-
eling to New York to obtain services that are legal in New York. 34
This assertion is not entitled to any significant weight. The immediate
problem in Bigelow was not an attempt by Virginia to forbid its citi-
zens from traveling to New York to receive abortion referral services.
Rather it was an attempt by Virginia to regulate advertising in Vir-
ginia of such services. Nor does Blackmun's assertion that Virginia
cannot prevent its residents from traveling to New York to use the
services appear to be an essential premise in the argument for the
Court's holding that the advertising is constitutionally protected. One
could construct an argument for that conclusion that took Blackmun's
assertion as a premise, but Blackmun's opinion is sufficiently unstruc-
tured so that there is no ground for claiming his actual argument de-
pends on such a premise.
Blackmun cites three cases in support of his assertion that Virginia
may not prevent its citizens from traveling to New York to use serv-
ices legal in New York. But none of the three cases is apposite.
United States v. Guest 135 stands for the proposition that there is a right
of interstate movement which is constitutionally protected against pri-
vate interference. Shapiro v. Thompson 136 is about a right of interstate
migration, which involves precisely changing one's state citizenship. 137
Doe v. Bolton 138 involves the article IV privileges and immunities
clause, and establishes that New York (Georgia, in the original) can-
not deny nonresidents access to abortion referral services (abortion
services, in the original) operating in New York. This is obviously a
quite different issue from whether Virginia can deny its own citizens
access to services in New York.
Bigelow was one of the Court's early efforts at protecting its hold-
ing in Roe v. Wade against subversion by the states. 139 Such efforts
were necessary, and perhaps still are. But the cases decided with this
134. 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975).
135. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
136. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
137. For comment on how the right to change one's citizenship interacts with the problem of
extraterritorial regulation of citizens, see text at note 142, and note 150 infra.
138. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
139. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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motivation should be treated with caution as sources of general consti-
tutional doctrine.
Of course, it may still be true, despite my dismissal of Bigelow as
authority, that a state cannot forbid its citizens to travel to another
state for the purpose of using services or engaging in activities that are
legal in the destination state. John Hart Ely has asked in a different
context:
[I]sn't there something somehow out of accord with at least our "small c
constitution" - out of accord in particular with the reasons we as a
nation decided to supersede the Articles of Confederation - in adopting
what amounts to a system of "personal law" wherein people carry their
home states' legal regimes around with them?140
I agree with Ely to this extent: I would say that no one can claim to be
in touch with our "small c constitution," or the spirit of our federal-
ism, who does not have some intuition that extraterritorial application
by a state of its laws is unconstitutional even where the state's own
citizens are concerned. But in the end, I think the stronger intuitions
run the other way.
We are a single nation, but we are a nation constituted of separate
states, with separate legal systems. The Constitution expressly recog-
nizes the reality and significance of state citizenship, both in article IV
and in the fourteenth amendment. Why should we not think of a state
as having an interest in its citizens which justifies regulation of their
conduct wherever they may be? It is worth mentioning that in Skiri-
otes v. Florida141 the Court allowed Florida to apply its criminal law to
a Florida citizen outside of Florida's territorial limits. To be sure, the
defendant was not within the territory of any other state or country.
He was diving for sponges in international waters bordering Florida.
Still, allowing criminal prosecution in these circumstances indicates
that a state's constitutionally permissible interest in the behavior of its
citizens does not stop at its territorial boundaries.
If the state's interest in the behavior of its citizens does not stop at
its territorial boundaries, why should it stop just because the citizen is
in some other state? Of course, there must be some limits to a state's
extraterritorial regulation of its citizens, in deference to the sover-
eignty of other states. If Arizona has a maximum speed limit on its
freeways of sixty-five miles per hour, Maine should not be allowed to
impose on Maine citizens driving through Arizona a speed limit of
fifty-five miles per hour, even if that is the law of Maine. This regula-
tion by Maine of the extraterritorial behavior of its citizens would in-
140. Ely, supra note 80, at 192.
141. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
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terfere too directly with Arizona's scheme for the convenience and
safety of traffic on its highways. But for myself, I cannot see that Vir-
ginia's forbidding citizens of Virginia from having abortions in New
York is subject to any comparable objection. I do not deny that New
York may want to have its own law apply to traveling Virginians.
New York may be eager to provide a place where Virginians can have
abortions. Even if this is the case, I would say that New York simply
does not have the same sort of constitutional interest in assisting
Virginians to avoid the effects of Virginia law that Arizona has in reg-
ulating its highways.
There is one definite and important limitation on the power of a
state to make its law a "personal law" for its citizens, which they carry
around with them wherever they go. A state cannot forbid its citizens
from emigrating. The Virginian who does not merely travel to New
York, but who uproots herself and moves her residence to New York,
acquires a new citizenship in the process, and she leaves her Virginia
citizenship behind. Once she has ceased to be a Virginia citizen, Vir-
ginia's hold on her is absolutely at an end. And except in very unusual
circumstances (for example, if she has committed a crime and is incar-
cerated in Virginia), 142 it is entirely up to her whether to sever her
connection with Virginia. If she chooses to, Virginia cannot stop her.
But to say that one can always abandon one's state and its laws by
changing one's citizenship is not to say that one can take a holiday
from the state's laws, while remaining a citizen, by sojourning else-
where. (In practice, of course, one usually can. People do it all the
time, as when they go to Nevada or New Jersey for a fling in the casi-
nos. The question, however, is whether these holidays from local law
are a constitutional entitlement, or whether they are enjoyed at the
home state's sufferance.) One could even argue that the standing pos-
sibility of changing one's state citizenship, for which one does not re-
quire the permission either of the state one abandons or of the state
one chooses to adopt, undercuts the claim that shorter holidays from
the control of one's state's laws are constitutionally guaranteed.
As is so often the case, the same basic facts might also suggest an
argument in the other direction. Thus, we might say that the existence
of a constitutional right to change one's state citizenship, and the ease
with which one can change, suggest that state citizenship is not really
important in our constitutional scheme. And the less important is
state citizenship, the less plausible it is that states can bind their citi-
142. For another possible exception to the right to emigrate from one's state, see note 150
infra.
1909August 1987]
HeinOnline  -- 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1909 1986-1987
Michigan Law Review
zens outside the territory of the state. For myself, I would not move
so quickly from the premise that one has a right to change one's state
citizenship to the conclusion that state citizenship is unimportant.
The importance of the states to our federal schem6 can hardly be de-
nied. If the states matter and citizenship matters (as the Constitution
testifies repeatedly), why should not state citizenship matter? We can
turn the latest argument against the importance of state citizenship on
its head, just as it turned on its head the preceding argument. Unless
state citizenship matters, why should it matter so much that there is a
right to change one's citizenship? The practical answer, of course, is
that the right to change one's citizenship matters in cases like Shapiro
v. Thompson, 143 where the state is trying to deny benefits to new arriv-
als. But Shapiro unmistakably presupposes that the state can make a
range of important benefits available only to citizens. What Shapiro
denies is that there can be a waiting period for citizenship. So, the
leading case for the right to change one's citizenship actually confirms
that state citizenship is important.
A few paragraphs back, I quoted John Hart Ely. In the pages
which precede the question I quoted, Ely discusses Austin v. New
Hampshire. 144 He points out that Austin can be read as authority
against the idea that a state's law is a personal law for its citizens. 145
Austin is an article IV privileges and immunities case, so it is not di-
rectly relevant to the question whether a state can apply its law extra-
territorially to its own citizens; and Ely himself expresses doubts about
whether Austin ought to stand as written.146 But Austin is still suffi-
ciently connected to our concerns, in an area where authority is
sparse, to make it worth pausing over.
At issue in Austin was the constitutionality of a New Hampshire
commuter's income tax, a tax which quite explicitly applied to the
New Hampshire-earned income of nonresidents only. The earned in-
come of residents was not taxed. Faced with a challenge to the tax
based on the privileges and immunities clause, New Hampshire at-
tempted to defend the tax on the ground that residents were subjected
to substantially equal taxation, in different forms. This argument was
not supported by the facts.147 New Hampshire's more interesting de-
fense was as follows. By its terms, the New Hampshire tax of four
percent was reduced, if the commuter's home state taxed income only
143. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
144. 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
145. Ely, supra note 80, at 186-91.
146. Id. at 190-91.
147. See 420 U.S. at 665 & n.10.
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at a lower rate, to the rate at which the income would have been taxed
if the commuter had earned it at home. Furthermore, the New Hamp-
shire tax did not apply at all unless the commuter's home state gave
her a credit for taxes'paid to New Hampshire on her New Hampshire
income. 48 So, New Hampshire argued, the commuter could not be
subjected to a higher tax by New Hampshire than was deemed appro-
priate by her home state; and furthermore, it was in the power of her
home state to save her from paying any New Hampshire tax at all, by
the simple expedient of denying her a tax credit. In sum, any harm to
the commuter should be laid at the feet of her home state, not of New
Hampshire.
This defense by New Hampshire the Supreme Court also rejected.
The Court appears to be saying that how New Hampshire may treat a
nonresident does not depend on how the nonresident's home state
treats her or what the nonresident's home state is prepared to claim
for her vis-A-vis New Hampshire. That is to some degree inconsistent
with the idea that the law of the commuter's state is her "personal
law."
Now, I am inclined to think that Austin was rightly decided but
that its implications are not as broad as they appear. Let me recall a
hypothetical which I have used elsewhere for a slightly different pur-
pose.' 49 Suppose that Illinois has a drinking age of twenty-one, and
Wisconsin, which shares a border with Illinois, has a drinking age of
eighteen. Suppose further that Wisconsin, out of deference to Illinois'
policy about drinking by Illinois teenagers, adopts a law forbidding
Illinois residents under age twenty-one from buying liquor in Wiscon-
sin. This Wisconsin law discriminates explicitly, subjecting Illinois
residents between eighteen and twenty-one to a burden which Wiscon-
sin residents of the same age are spared. But I am strongly inclined to
think this Wisconsin law is constitutional.
The difference between the New Hampshire commuter income tax
and the Wisconsin law is this. The discrimination in the New Hamp-
shire law was primarily intended to benefit New Hampshire and New
Hampshire residents. New Hampshire was trying to swell its tax reve-
nue at the expense of nonresidents. It is possible that New Hampshire
was not totally heedless of its constitutional responsibilities; the New
Hampshire legislators may really have believed the "substantially
equal taxation" argument the Court so easily rejected. But this much
is absolutely clear. There is not the slightest reason to think of New
148. 420 U.S. at 666.
149. See Regan, supra note 5, at 1127.
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Hampshire's fundamental motivation in taxing nonresidents as being
respect for the policies of their home states that they should be taxed.
Even though New Hampshire limited the tax by reference to certain
choices by other states, the positive motivation for the tax was solely
to benefit New Hampshire. With the Wisconsin law, in contrast, the
primary motivation for drawing the distinction between Illinois and
Wisconsin eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds is not benefit to Wisconsin or
Wisconsin residents. It is respect for Illinois' wishes about the drink-
ing behavior of its underage citizens. (It is possible, of course, that the
same Wisconsin law should have been adopted for the purpose of pre-
serving scarce liquor or scarce space in bars for Wisconsin residents.
But that is not the case in my hypothetical.)
The upshot seems to be this. A state may not introduce discrimi-
nations against nonresidents into its law in order to benefit itself or its
residents, and then defend the discrimination which appears in its own
law by saying either that the nonresident is treated no worse than she
would be at home or that the nonresident is burdened only by virtue of
her own state's acquiescence. (That is Austin.) On the other hand, a
state may, at least sometimes, introduce into its law discriminations
against nonresidents which are designed in the first instance to respect
the interests of other states in the behavior, even the extraterritorial
behavior, of their citizens. (I leave for some other occasion questions
such as how Wisconsin might know whether Illinois cared about ex-
traterritorial drinking by Illinois teenagers, and whether Wisconsin
would be required to respect an announcement by the Illinois legisla-
ture that Illinois was content to have its eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds
drink in Wisconsin, just so long as they did not do it in Illinois.)
Returning to the matter of abortion laws, the tendency of my re-
marks is that a state may regulate the extraterritorial behavior of its
citizens, and therefore that if Roe v. Wade were overruled, states
would be free to forbid their citizens from having abortions elsewhere.
This is not a conclusion I am pleased with on policy grounds. I hope
no state would do this; and if someone could come up with a constitu-
tional argument against extraterritorial legislation in the abortion con-
text specifically, I would be delighted. 150 We ought to observe,
150. Unfortunately, it seems more likely that a state would have especially broad powers of
extraterritorial legislation where abortion is concerned. (I am still assuming that Roe v. Wade is
out of the way.) The presence of the fetus makes abortion sui generis in almost any context.
Even if the state could not generally regulate the extraterritorial behavior of its citizens, it might
yet advance a claim to forbid out-of-state travel for the purpose of securing an abortion, on the
ground that traveling with such a purpose would amount to removing the fetus, a sort of proto-
citizen, from the jurisdiction for the purpose of killing it. Indeed, I think the state could argue in
good conscience, on the same grounds, that it could prevent a woman even from moving away
completely, with the intention of changing her residence and citizenship, for the purpose of hay-
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however, that it is possible to imagine considerably more sympathetic
uses of a state power to legislate extraterritorially for its own citizens
than any we have yet discussed. For example, suppose that Illinois
tried to preserve its drinking age of twenty-one by forbidding underage
Illinoisans from drinking in Wisconsin. Aside from difficulties of en-
forcement, such a law would have much to recommend it, both as an
attempt to minimize drunk driving in Illinois by Illinois teenagers re-
turning from out-of-state adventures, and as part of an attempt by the
state to oversee its young citizens' developing relationship with a pow-
erful, and omnipresent, drug.
Let me emphasize in closing that all of my conclusions about par-
ticular cases are tentative. My speculations are offered primarily to
demonstrate that what we know about extraterritoriality is much less
than what we have still to work out.
ing an abortion. This despite the sacrosanctness, in ordinary contexts, of the citizen's right to
abandon her state for a new one. See text at note 142 supra. (I say the state could make this
argument in good conscience. But I am fairly clear that at this point the state ought not to
prevail.)
It occurred to me just as this essay was going to press that Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393
(1975), is a case well worth thinking about in connection with issues about state law as "personal
law." In Sosna, the Court upheld a one-year residency requirement for securing a local divorce,
despite the strong presumption against durational residency requirements which had been estab-
lished by Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and succeeding cases. One possible expla-
nation of Sosna is that the Court was deferring to what it saw as Iowa's attempt to accommodate
the continuing interests of New York (the state Sosna had left) in Sosna's relationships with
family members still in New York. Viewed this way, Sosna is some support for my claim that the
Wisconsin discrimination against under-age Illinois drinkers would be constitutional. See text at
note 149 supra. Sosna also lends indirect support (alas) to my suggestion earlier in this footnote
that a state could in good conscience claim a right to forbid its citizens from abandoning their
citizenship in order to seek an abortion. After all, Sosna represents a case where one is not
entitled to alter one's citizenship status immediately for all purposes just by one's voluntary
choice. Sosna upholds a limitation on the newly acquired citizenship imposed by the destination
state; but the abandoned state could also find support in Sosna for its attempt to maintain some
aspects of its hold on the departing citizen when that is necessary to protect other members of
her family (such as the fetus).
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